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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the dogmatic implications of the well-
established principle that trademark rights are nothing but a part of 
unfair competition law.  It begins by studying the historical development 
of trademark protection, which reveals that the grant of an exclusive 
right was not only directed at combating consumer deception, but also a 
means to protect goodwill as an intangible value of the trademark 
holder.  In the course of legal development, the notion of protecting the 
public from various forms of consumer confusion became the dominant 
justification for recognizing and enforcing trademark rights, thereby 
suppressing trader interests viably protectable through a system of 
trademark protection based on the property concept.  The interest of 
the trademark holder to exploit his goodwill, even in distant markets 
and in the absence of any likelihood of confusion, was the subject of 
dilution laws, which were often seen as both an undesirable 
propertization of trademark doctrine that unduly restricted freedom of 
competition and as an exception to traditional trademark theory.1  
Nowadays, trademarks are used in competition for an array of purposes 
irrelevant to source identification.  Traders make use of the system of 
trademark protection not simply because they seek to avoid goodwill 
destruction arising from consumer confusion but in order to capture 
goodwill in and of itself as an intangible value that generates demand 
and gives the right-holder the possibility to exercise market power.  
Trade dress claims are the most obvious example of that phenomenon.  
For example, making a claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
 
1.   See ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS  § 5.01(2)(c) (Mathew 
Bender 2011). 
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against the imitation of a golf course hole design2 cannot be said to be 
exclusively driven by concerns about source confusion.  Rather, the 
claimant seeks to capture the customers who prefer that type of playing 
field.  In reality, the trade dress plaintiff seeks to avoid competitive 
imitation.  To the extent that this is legitimate in view of the postulate 
for an effective competition, the exclusive right has to give effect to this 
valuation of the competitive order.  Part II elaborates upon these 
introductory remarks. 
Part III conducts an economic analysis of product imitation by 
applying the economic theory on product differentiation.  The result is 
that, in principle, the effectiveness of competition relies on competition 
by substitution because it results in increased product variety leading to 
the satisfaction of diverse consumer needs.  The protection of traders’ 
interests therefore takes place primarily because it promotes a dynamic 
competition process and not solely in its own merit.3  The implication for 
the unfair competition cause of action is the revival of the 
misappropriation doctrine in the case of product design imitation. 
Having established that the concept of effective competition justifies 
imitation bans, we proceed to Part IV assuming that this valuation of 
the unfair competition laws should have an effect on trademark doctrine 
because the trademark exclusivity is in fact, as its historical development 
also shows, a realization of mandates flowing out of the competitive 
order.  This is the actual meaning of the statement that trademarks are 
nothing but a part of unfair competition laws.  Such systematic 
interpretation can also be supported by the complementarity theory of 
intellectual property rights and competitive norms, which dictates that 
the promotion of effective competition should be an integral valuation 
of trademark rules. 
The recognition of a protectable interest of the trade dress claimant 
in avoiding imitative competition and of the public in a dynamic 
competition with differentiated products affects the interpretation of 
trademark doctrines such as distinctiveness, functionality, and the 
likelihood of confusion in a way that promotes such interests by infusing 
proprietary elements into trademark theory.  The proprietary elements 
coexist with the traditional trademark policy against consumer 
confusion in a system that purports to balance all competitive interests 
 
2.  Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998). 
3.  On the necessity to design IP rights in a manner that promotes dynamic competition 
as an effluence of the complementarity principle see generally Josef Drexl, Is there a ‘more 
economic approach’ to intellectual property and competition law?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 27 (Josef Drexl ed., 2005). 
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involved in a trademark dispute.  Accordingly, trade dress should be 
held inherently distinctive if it is indeed differentiated from that of 
competing products and if the existence of alternative designs 
guarantees that awarding protection would not hinder competition.  
Functionality should be determined in terms of competitive need in 
order to enable the protection of differentiation by product design.  The 
economic theory of product differentiation suggests the limits of trade 
dress rights and the normative scope of the functionality doctrine as 
well: plaintiffs should be prevented from imposing harm on locational 
competition by monopolizing submarkets.  This observation links the 
limits of trade dress protection to the normative valuations of the 
Sherman Act. 
At the same time, the point is made that the cumulative protection 
of product design by different IP rights can be explained if we consider 
that the market power conferred by trade dress rights has a different 
justification ground and different limits than the market power 
conferred by IP rights encouraging authorship and inventorship.  If the 
promotion of product differentiation should indeed be a concern of 
trademark theory, then the scope of protection should extend beyond 
source confusion and include imitative action that misappropriates the 
differentiation value of the senior trade dress.  Infringement should 
therefore be decided pursuant to the “subliminal confusion doctrine,” 
which prevents the misappropriation of favorable associations of 
consumers with regard to the senior mark.  After providing a summary 
of the conclusions reached on the scope of trade dress protection, Part 
IV ends with the proposition of expanding proprietary protection of 
trademarks independent of the policy against consumer confusion. 
II.  TRADEMARKS AND COMPETITION 
A.  Trademark Law as Part of a Broader Unfair Competition Law 
In the 1800s, an English Chancery Court recognized a right of 
property on a sign used to distinguish products in trade for the first 
time.4  The new property right sprang out of the tort of unfair 
competition, which protected traders from fraudulent diversion of their 
trade.5  The prohibition of passing-off came about in turn as a 
 
4.  Millington v. Fox (1838), 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (Ch.). 
5.  There is a theoretical “chicken or egg” dichotomy of whether it was the tort of 
trademark infringement or the tort of unfair competition that first came into the legal world.  
Compare JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2 at 2–4 (4th ed. 1924); Edward S. Rogers, Comments on the Modern Law of 
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modification of the nominate tort of deceit so as to regulate the 
competitive relationship.6  This was necessary because the action at law 
for deceit was only available to the deceived consumer, who received 
the misrepresentation.7  Under the new unfair competition cause of 
action, the competitor was able to sue at law for damages arising out of 
the deceitful trade diversion.  The misrepresentation element of the tort 
was often found established in cases where the defendant had copied or 
imitated a sign that the plaintiff had used to distinguish his products and 
thereby deceived the consumer regarding the origin of the goods sold.8 
Later on, the Courts of Equity realized that such protection was not 
adequately protecting traders taking part in the competitive process.  It 
was recognized that each trader has a legitimate interest of being 
protected in the probable expectancy that he will be able to trade 
undisturbed on the basis of the reputational merits acquired by his 
performance in the market.9  In other words, traders should be able to 
acquire and exploit goodwill.  For that purpose, it would be necessary to 
have a right of exclusivity with regard to a sign distinguishing his 
products according to their commercial source.10  It is only through the 
exclusive use of a trademark that a single undertaking can be held 
responsible for the goods marketed under one single trademark, and 
thus, autonomusly build up commercial goodwill.  Protecting 
trademarks as property would guarantee the exclusive use of the sign 
even in those cases where the action at law could not be maintained 
because the element of fraud was missing.11  Since the new property 
 
Unfair Trade, 3 ILL. L. REV. 551, 552 (1909) (considering the evolution of the unfair 
competition cause of action a necessity, which arose out of the fact that competitors 
developed more complicated methods of fraudulently diverting trade than the usurpation of a 
trademark), with WALTER J. DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR 
TRADING 42 (1936) (rightfully pointing out that the principle, “no one has a right to sell his 
own goods as the goods of another,” had already been established long before the litigation 
of trademark liability issues).  The theoretical dispute is of no practical importance since the 
systematic adherence of trademarks to the law of unfair competition cannot be set in doubt. 
6.  ROBERT F.V. HEUSTON & RICHARD A. BUCKLEY, SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 434, 449 (19th ed. 1987). 
7.  HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 411; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wilson (1875–1876), 2 L.R.Ch. 
434, 453–60 (Mellish, L.J.) (Gr. Brit.). 
8.  FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING 
TO TRADE-MARKS 141–45 (1925); see also Lionel Bently, From Communication to Thing: 
Historical Aspects of the Conceptualisation of Trademarks as Property, in TRADEMARK LAW 
AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 8–12 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
& Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (presenting the relevant case law).  
9.  SCHECHTER, supra note 8, at 157. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. at 138–39, 152. 
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right was constructed in order to protect the interests of traders in 
competition, trademark law has since then been conceptualized as 
nothing else but a part of unfair competition law.12  The consuming 
public was purported to be the second beneficiary of the new legal 
action, as trademark protection was a way to protect buying decisions 
from misrepresentations in trade.  At this point, it should be highlighted 
that at the time the new property right was being conceived, the 
interests of trademark owners and consumers were held to be equal in 
terms of worthiness of legal protection. 
B.  Seeking the Limits of the Trademark Monopoly 
In view of the common-law tradition of disregarding monopolies, it 
was not strange that from the outset, legal theory took a rather 
restrictive stance against trademark protection.  The main concern was 
that trademarks threatened to create language or production 
monopolies.  The solution provided by the legal order to the problem of 
the language monopoly was to protect only coined and imaginative 
word marks as property (“technical trademarks”).13  Signs other than 
fanciful marks were termed “tradenames” and their protection was 
possible only by means of the unfair competition action where it was 
necessary to prove fraudulent trade diversion.14 To avoid production 
monopolies based on trademarks, descriptive terms were totally 
excluded from property-based trademark protection.  In Canal 
Company v. Clark, for example, the plaintiff was the first company 
mining coal in the region of the Lackawanna Valley.15  As the defendant 
started producing coal in the same region, he asserted trademark rights 
on the term “Lackawanna coal,” which the new entrants used truthfully 
to connote the geographical origin of their products.16  Trademark 
protection was denied not only due to the inability of descriptive terms 
to point to the commercial source of a product but also because the 
plaintiff’s exclusive use of the sign in dispute would practically confer 
upon the plaintiff “a monopoly in the sale of . . . goods other than those 
 
12.  Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 404 (1916) (“The common law 
of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.”).  See also United Drug 
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 
624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980). 
13.  See generally Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-
An Analysis and Synthesis: I,  30 COLUM. L. REV. 168 (1930); E.R. Coffin, Fraud as an 
Element of Unfair Competition, 16 HARV. L. REV. 272, 274–78 (1902–1903). 
14.  Id. 
15.  Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1871). 
16.  Id. at 315. 
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produced or made by himself.”17 
Soon it was realized that the line of demarcation provided by the 
distinction between “technical trademarks” and “tradenames” was not a 
satisfactory method to find the golden section between furthering 
competition through the allocation of property rights and avoiding 
undesirable monopolistic effects in the field of trademark law.  Property 
was, in those days, an absolutist concept,18 which meant that the owner 
of a “technical trademark” could even prohibit innocent uses in remote 
markets, where goodwill destruction or misappropriation did not come 
into consideration.19  Getting back to Canal Company v. Clark, it should 
be noted that the result does not reflect an optimal balance of the 
competitive interests involved in a trademark dispute.  The plaintiff had 
a legitimate trademark interest on the geographically descriptive term 
so as to communicate to the consumers the fact that he was a pioneer of 
the regional mining industry and had a long tradition in the field.  The 
communicative interest of competitors could be satisfied with a non-
trademark (descriptive) use of the term. 
These problems were overcome as the absolutist conception of 
property was abandoned for the functional approach propagated by the 
movement of legal realism in the early twentieth century.20  The legal 
exclusivity was restricted on trademark use, while the trademark owner 
 
17.  Id. at 323. 
18.  Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of 
Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 316–26 (1979).  McClure blames the property 
theory of trademarks for the expansion of the exclusive right observed in the last decades and 
attributes its rise to the then contemporary method of legal formalism.  The property right 
was obtained by simply usurping and possessing a sign.  The conceptualization of trademarks 
as property has also been presented as a procedural necessity because the equity jurisdiction 
would not intervene unless a violation of a private right was alleged.  Robert G. Bone, 
Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
547, 561–67 (2006).  On the other hand, a different view links the property concept of 
trademarks to a natural right’s theory for the protection of goodwill since this intangible 
value is created with the right-holder’s costs and labor.  Mark P. McKenna, The Normative 
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1873–95 (2007).  McKenna 
also makes the point that equity used to intervene to forbid passing-off even in the absence of 
an exclusive right.  Id. at 1857–58.  In any case, the creation of the property right actually 
derives from the competition policy decision to protect trader goodwill.  By recognizing a 
property right intending protection of trader-goodwill and elimination of deception the 
Courts of Equity were in essence making unfair competition law. 
19.  Kenneth. J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The 
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 343–48 (1980). 
20.  For the shortcomings of formalism and the need to balance the conflicting interests 
involved in a legal dispute, including an analysis of trademark law issues, see Felix S. Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809–49, 
(1935); McClure, supra note 18, at 326. 
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could not prohibit the descriptive uses of a sign.21 
In the course of legal history, it turned out that the Chicago School 
of antitrust analysis was the decisive influence on modern U.S. 
trademark doctrine.22  Its basic premise has been that the purpose of the 
antitrust laws is to maximize consumer welfare.23  As a result, the 
interests of competitors were neglected so as to promote aggressive 
forms of competitive rivalry for the benefit of the consumer.  Antitrust 
was taken out of its political context and economic efficiency was held 
to be the primary goal of the Sherman Act.24  Transplanted into the 
trademark system, the notions of the Chicago School had the following 
doctrinal implications: (a) the consumer-benefiting efficiencies 
regulated by trademark law are related to the minimization of consumer 
search costs in the market.25  This conclusion was derived from an 
application of information economics principles indicating that without 
a credible system of recognizing the commercial source of trade goods, 
markets would collapse; and (b) the primacy of the consumer interest as 
a value judgment of the competitive order projected in the antitrust laws 
means that trademark law is solely oriented towards consumer 
protection by limiting consumer search costs.  The expansion of the 
forms of actionable confusion has been sanctified by the necessity of 
improving the quality of information available to consumers in the 
marketplace.  Although it has been the driving force for the 
development of trademark rights, the element of trader protection has 
been suppressed and limited to a reflex of the consumer-protection 
aspect of trademark protection.  It is in this sense that trademark rights 
are considered as part of the law regulating the competitive process 
today. 
C.  Trade Dress Rights, Product Differentiation, and Protection from 
Imitative Competition 
The comprehension of trademarks purely as instruments that 
principally promote informational values in the marketplace is a 
 
21.  Handler & Pickett, supra note 13, at 175. 
22.  McKenna, supra note 18, at 1846–48. 
23.  See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 925, 941 (1979). 
24.  This became the main point of criticism towards the Chicago conceptualization of 
antitrust. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. 
REV. 213 (1985). 
25.  William M. Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 
TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988). 
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misconception because it disregards the actual use of those legal rights 
in competition.  This could be exemplified in the field of trade dress 
protection.  It is hard to believe that the assertion of trademark rights on 
the outer appearance of products takes place because the trademark 
holder is concerned about the consumer not being able to immediately 
and without delay find his product without being confused with regard 
to its source.  In making a trade dress claim, his main goal is to obtain 
protection against imitative competition from his competitors.  Now the 
question arises as to whether such a business aim could or should be 
part of the legislative program of the trademark laws.  The fact that 
trademarks are a part of unfair competition law leads to the thought 
that the interests of the trademark holder have to be taken into account 
on equal terms with those of competitors and consumers.  Legal 
evaluations regarding trademark matters should be provided after 
balancing all interests involved without giving an a priori prominence to 
consumer interests related to market transparency.26  The information-
transmitting model of trademark law is not apt to make such a balance 
of interests.  Approaching the legal question of the scope of trade dress 
protection from the point of view of consumer search costs tends to 
undermine the claimant’s interest against competitor imitation.  The 
consumer is in fact not used to making inferences about the commercial 
origin of goods from product design.  This argumentation denies in 
many cases protection to the interests of trademark holders without 
substantively assessing their merit. 
 
III.  FUNDAMENTAL INTUITIONS OF THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION 
A.  The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
At some point, the neoclassical concept of perfect competition 
stumbled upon the reality that monopolistic elements are unavoidable 
 
26.  The need to adopt a teleological approach in trademark law is also highlighted by 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 
84 IOWA L. REV. 611 (1999).  Annette Kur, Strategic Branding: Does Trademark Law 
Provide for Sufficient Self Help and Self Healing Forces?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
MARKET POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 191, 195 (Inge Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds. 
2008) (emphasizing the necessity of shaping the doctrine in a way that balances all 
competitive interests involved).  See also McKenna, supra note 18, at 1896–1915 (McKenna 
has, for similar reasons, a positive stance towards the expansion of the trademark exclusivity 
so as to protect legitimate interests of the right-holder). 
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in actual markets.  Economic theory started then to analyze the 
implications of those imperfections for market performance.27  Edward 
Chamberlin focused on product heterogeneity and observed that the 
existence of differentiated products in the market prevents the 
exhaustion of economies of scale.28 
He slightly modified the model of a perfectly competitive market by 
assuming that products are heterogeneous while there is a significant 
grade of substitutability among them.29  In the short run, it is further 
assumed that the number of competitors is small enough to allow supra-
competitive profits.  As the supply is differentiated, consumer 
preferences are being created.  At this stage it is observed that contrary 
to what happens under perfectly competitive conditions, each producer 
is able to exercise some degree of price control regarding the consumers 
who prefer his product, which is of course limited by the rules governing 
the elasticity of demand. 
Assuming absence of barriers to entry and that new market entrants 
proportionally usurp market share from incumbents, the development 
of market conditions runs as follows: newcomer entrance will continue 
until the economic profits of the market fall to zero level.  In 
equilibrium there is a relatively large number of producers offering 
differentiated products.  Because of their small market share—also 
attributed to the relatively high substitutability of the various products 
offered—none of these producers has enough customers to support 
production that takes advantage of scale economies (“excess capacity 
theorem”).30  Chamberlin found such an outcome unsatisfactory from 
the perspective of productive efficiency because the same total market 
output could have been produced by a fewer number of firms 
exhausting their productive ability.31  Macroeconomically this would 
better serve the efficient allocation of resources.  On the other hand, he 
realized that sacrifices in productive efficiency also have positive 
 
27. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 214 (7th ed. 1956) (“pure 
competition may no longer be regarded as in any sense an ‘ideal‘ for purposes of welfare 
economics“). 
28.  B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723, 763 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds. 1989). 
29.  JOHN BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION 45 (1991); RICHARD G. LIPSEY & ALEC K. CHRYSTAL, ECONOMICS 197 
(10th ed. 2004). 
30.  CHAMBERLIN, supra note 27, at 104–09; Nicholas Kaldor, Market Imperfection and 
Excess Capacity, ECONOMICA 2, 33, 33–34 (1935). 
31.  CHAMBERLIN, supra note 27, at 115. 
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welfare implications in the sense that product differentiation satisfies 
diverse consumer needs arising out of the inhomogenity of the 
consumer preferences.  Moreover, Chamberlin argued that productive 
efficiency and product variety are equally important elements in a 
market economy, which according to his view means that economic 
decisions should balance them taking into account not only a specific 
industry but also the economy as a whole.32 
The observations of Chamberlin prepared the ground for the 
concept of workable competition formulated later on by John M. 
Clark,33 who made the point that market imperfections (e.g. product 
heterogeneity) may lead to welfare-enhancing results if coupled with 
other “remedial” imperfections (e.g. diverse consumer preferences). 
B. Product Variety and Social Welfare 
Subsequent economic models integrated the consumer welfare 
aspects of product variety in the Chamberlinian economic model.34  A 
new assumption was introduced to this effect, namely that each 
marginal consumption unit introduced into the market adds to the total 
utility of the consumer, who is better off when having the possibility to 
choose among substitutable products.  In other words, each new product 
creates marginal utility because it broadens the available choices within 
the market. Product variety demands a price premium though, since 
introducing a new product raises the cost of entry, which is then 
reflected in the end-price.  The price premium can also be seen in 
macroeconomic terms as social loss attributed to the resulting excess 
capacities.  Accordingly, achieving the social optimum entails the task of 
finding out how many product varieties should be produced and in what 
quantity. 
Those economic studies come to the conclusion that the market 
mechanism would never gravitate around an equilibrium that 
corresponds to the social optimum.35  Given the possible economic 
 
32.  E. H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 
85, 88 (1950). 
33.  J. M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241–
56 (1940).  Perfect competition was then considered as the optimum but unrealistic 
benchmark of competition policy. The impossibility of achieving perfectly competitive 
markets led to the idea of attempting to make competition workable by adding remedial 
imperfections (Theory of Second Best). 
34.  Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 
REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976); Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic 
Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977). 
35. Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 28, at 731. 
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profits of the relevant market, if the fixed costs of entry are at a 
relatively high level, then the number of firms (products) would be 
suboptimal.  There would be less variety than demanded.  On the other 
hand, if fixed costs are low, excessive entry will follow, which in turn 
means that there would be too much variety.36  Social losses in the form 
of unexhausted economies of scale go in tandem with new market entry.  
In conclusion, the market mechanism cannot by itself lead to optimal 
product variety. 
C.  Locational Competition 
1.  Asymmetrical Preferences and Market Power 
Chamberlinian models assume that consumer preferences are 
symmetric in the sense that the brands available are equally good 
substitutes for each other.  This assumption simplifies the economic 
analysis in that it allows us to examine the impact of product variety on 
social welfare by focusing on a representative consumer.  In real 
markets however, one cannot under normalcy claim that the consumers 
see all available products as equally appealing.  Each consumer prefers 
his own ideal product and there are only a few highly substitutable 
offers that come into play as serious alternatives.  Competition is 
therefore being intensified in market segments comprised of goods 
depicting high demand substitutability.  For strategic firm behavior this 
implies that there are demand elasticities in the market waiting to be 
exploited and that it pays for a producer to create a market niche 
including the customers preferring his own product.  Within the limits of 
such niche, he is able to exercise control over the price and earn 
monopolistic profits.  Differentiation thus leads to a certain degree of 
market power. 
2.  Hotelling’s Linear Market 
Hotelling was the first economist occupied with the question of 
whether firms tend to differentiate or conversely prefer to compete in 
terms of quantity and price.  As a starting point for his economic model, 
he took a linear market of specific length, where two Bertrand-
Duopolists (A and B) compete by offering a differentiated product.37  
To envision this, one could consider a long narrow city having one single 
 
36. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 218 (4th ed. 2005). 
37.  Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 41, 44–50 
(1929). 
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street with two gas stations or a sandy beach with two ice cream 
vendors.38  Consumers are supposed to be symmetrically resided along 
the street or be lying down at the beach.  The differentiating factor is 
the transport costs.  Buying decisions are influenced not only by the 
price but also by the transportation costs, as each consumer prefers the 
outlet nearer to his location. 
The social optimum is achieved when both outlets lie at the anti-
diametrical points W and E distancing 1/4 of the total market length 
from the market’s endpoints.39  At this point, the total transportation 
costs incurred by consumers are the lowest possible.  It is rather unlikely 
though that under such a state of affairs firms would remain inactive 
since they have the possibility of shifting their location and gain in 
market share.  As A is moving along the linear market towards B, he 
wins all of the customers he is leaving behind on his westward side.  He 
is maximizing his market share amounting to a 75% increase when he 
places his outlet right next to that of his competitor supplying all 
customers located within a distance of 3/4 of the linear market’s length.40  
A profit-maximizing B would in turn move westwards placing his outlet 
right next to that of A who is now supplying only 25% of the market 
covering only 1/4 of the total market’s length.41  A would react 
analogously.  The strategic interaction of the duopolist culminates in a 
Nash-Equilibrium regarding location, where both outlets standing back-
to-back in the middle of the market.42  At this point both sellers have a 
50% market share and no player has anything to gain by changing 
strategy.43  This means practically that the transport costs are double 
compared to those reflecting the social optimum.  For every consumer 
there is only one possible supplier (principle of minimum product 
differentiation).44 
3.  The Principle of Maximum Product Differentiation 
Hotelling’s conclusion is strictly bound to the extreme assumptions 
underlying his model, namely the existence of a Bertrand-Duopoly and 
the limited length of the linear market.45  Modifying the model would 
 
38.  HAL VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 456 (Norton 6th ed. 2003). 
39.  See Appendix, diagram 1. 
40.  See Appendix, diagram 2. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Hotelling, supra note 37. 
44.  BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 29, at 22. 
45.  See generally Nicholas Economides, Hotelling’s Main Street With More Than Two 
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lead to different results.  Suppose a third seller comes along:46 the profit 
maximizing location for him would be right next to one of the two 
neighboring sellers in the middle of the market.  The middle player is 
being squeezed by his competitors and has no market share at all.47  He 
can retaliate though by jumping on the other side of one of his 
competitors and invading thus in the latter’s territory.48  Such strategic 
interaction between the involved firms continues until it does not pay 
for the middleman to relocate anymore.  At this phase all firms are 
located at the quartiles of the linear market.  A single competitor stands 
alone at one quartile serving 2/4 of the consumers situated along the 
beach (50% market share).  The other two players are located at the 
other quartile, each one supplying 1/4 of the market (25% market 
share).49  The middleman has no way to increase his market share by 
moving along the linear market.  However, the spatial competition 
model with three players has no equilibrium since the “dominant” 
player would make use of his possibility to expand his market share 
even further by moving towards the opposite quartile.  The strategic 
game on location choice would then start all over again.  In any case the 
model shows that firms have a tendency to disperse along the linear 
market so as to enlarge their market share to the greatest extent 
possible.  This is confirmed when more players are added and strategic 
interaction culminates in an equilibrium.50  If there are four ice-cream 
vendors competing for the bathers of the sandy beach, then they will be 
evenly spread along the linear market at equilibrium each one 
controlling 1/4 of the market (25% market share).  The mitigation of the 
exceptional circumstances from which Hotelling’s principle of minimum 
product differentiation is derived, leads to the exact opposite 
conclusion, namely that undertakings seek to differentiate by vendor 
location in order to maximize profits (principle of maximum product 
 
Competitors, 33 J. REGIONAL SCI. 303 (1993); Claude d’Aspremont Lynde, J. Jaskold 
Gabszewicz & Jacques-Francois Thisse, On Hotelling’s “Stability in Competition," 47 
ECONOMETRICA 1145 (1979) (assuming quadratic costs instead of extending the linear 
market). 
46.  A. P. Lerner & H. W. Singer, Some Notes on Duopoly and Spatial Competition, 45 
J. POL. ECON. 145, 176–82 (1937). 
47.  See Appendix, diagram 3. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. 
50.  B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, The Principle of Minimum Differentiation 
Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition, 42 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 27 (1975). 
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differentiation).51  However, it must be acknowledged that Hotelling set 
the conceptual framework for analyzing competition with differentiated 
products. 
4.  Locational Competition in Product Space 
The seminal works of Lancaster pioneered this field.  He discredited 
the consumer theoretical axiom that the gain in utility is proportional to 
the number of goods consumed.  Consumer preferences are directed at 
product characteristics for the sake of which products are being bought 
(characteristics approach).52  If, for example, the consumer is looking for 
foodstuffs rich in protein and vitamins, he is rather interested in 
obtaining the optimum amount of such consumption units regardless of 
the number of products needed for this purpose.  The consumer is 
indifferent towards the prospect of obtaining the desired amount of 
protein and vitamins by buying a single product or a combination of 
products.53  Lancaster’s concept has influenced many fields of economic 
analysis and in particular that of product differentiation.  His conception 
allows the drawing of the following analogy: Just as gas stations compete 
on location within a city, undertakings compete by differentiating the 
characteristics of their products.  Just as firms place their outlets in a 
linear market, undertakings choose a location in a fictitious product 
space.54  Taking breakfast cereal as an example, one could assume that 
products of this category vary according to their sweetness, oral 
sensation, brand character, and package-design.  Given this four-
dimensional spectrum (product space) firms differentiate by creating a 
unique bundle of those characteristics. 
5.  Spatial Models with a Circular Market 
The analysis of locational competition within the product space 
confirms the principle of maximum product differentiation.  The 
scholarly example studies locational competition with regard to 
consumer demand for ice cream.55  The possibilities for different flavors 
 
51.  Nicholas Economides, The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited, 24 
EUROP. ECON. REV. 345–68 (1984). 
52.  KELVIN LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICROECONOMICS 217–18 
(Rand McNally 2d ed. 1974).  
53.  The example is taken from JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 99 (1988). 
54.  Kelvin Lancaster, The Economics of Product Variety: A Survey, 9 MARKETING 
SCI. 189, 200 (1990). 
55.  CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 36, at 223. 
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of ice cream represent the various locations in product space.56  Apart 
from that, competitors face competition only from an outside good (e.g., 
cake).57  The example gives us a rough picture of locational competition 
within a broader relevant market.  Competition among differentiated 
products (characteristic bundles) is modeled on a circular rather than a 
linear market assuming again that consumers are evenly spread on its 
perimeter.  Contrary to a linear market of defined boundaries, in the 
circular model there is no preferable location conferring monopoly in 
the literal sense.  On Hotelling’s street one could imagine a gas station 
in its middle capturing the whole market.  Due to its economic 
importance, the middle point unfolds a centripetal force in the 
marketplace.  This is not the case, however, when the street is of infinite 
length or so long that it does not pay for the duopolists to locate 
themselves next to each other in the center of the market.  If the road is 
too long it might be that the movement towards the center results in 
losing peripheral customers who cannot afford buying the product due 
to immense transportation costs.  Settling at the center of the market is 
not the optimal strategic choice if those customers outnumber those 
won by such a move.  Thus, the concept of a circular market avoids the 
fallacy detected in Hotelling’s model.58  The absence of an economically 
preferred location provides a rough simulation of a linear market of 
indefinite length. 
Market behavior is presented in the circular model as a two-stage 
game where firms first choose location and then pricing strategy.59  The 
choice of location is affected by the monopolistic prospect of avoiding 
price competition and exercising of price control within a market niche 
consisting of the consumers situated in the captured location.  Under 
such circumstances, firm behavior confirms the principle of maximum 
product differentiation: sellers would distance from one another around 
the circle so that each one acquires a monopolistic area and becomes the 
sole supplier for consumers situated within its boundaries.  If barriers to 
entry are high and the number of participants in the market low, then 
the consumer location areas confined to each firm would—in view of 
the transport costs—not intersect60 (monopoly regions).61  This means 
 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id.  Circular models build upon the work of Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic 
Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 156 (1979). 
59.  LUIS M. B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 215–17 
(2000). 
60.  See Appendix, diagram 4. 
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that there would be no competition on the price, which is actually what 
firms pursue.  The social loss of higher prices is a premium that the 
consumer has to pay in order to satisfy needs not covered by 
competition among homogenous products.  The concept of dynamic 
competition promotes efforts to win the consumer by delivering 
products matching individual taste and not necessarily by offering lower 
prices.  If barriers to entry are low, the circle bows allocated to market 
players would to some extent intersect with the result that, at least 
regarding some consumers, there would be two or more suppliers 
coming into play62 (competitive regions).63  Within those competitive 
areas, there would be price competition. 
6.  Cluster Effects 
The economic models discussed above study the phenomenon of 
locational competition assuming that the consumers are evenly 
distributed across the characteristics spectrum.  In fact, some locations 
of the product space might be vacant of consumers because the 
preferences of the latter concentrate on some specific characteristic 
bundles.  Firms would then cluster around such locations where 
competition on the price would be intensified.64 
7.  Summary of the Emerging Economic Principles 
Firms tend to differentiate so as to create their own market niche.  
Product differentiation leads to static inefficiencies but creates dynamic 
gains for consumers in the form of innovation (introduction of new 
products) and, consequently, product variety.  The socially optimal 
degree of product differentiation has to be defined by setting a limit to 
the static losses an economy wishes to sacrifice for the sake of 
dynamising competition.  The economic theory of product 
differentiation disapproves competition by imitation.  Imitative activity 
makes the choice of location in the product space futile from an 
economic point of view, since firms would not be able to reap the 
benefits of their strategic move in competition.  This would undermine 
product variety. 
 
61.  CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 36, at 225–26. 
62.  See Appendix, diagram 5. 
63.  CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 36, at 227–28. 
64.  Lancaster, supra note 54, at 197. 
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D.  Implications for Unfair Competition Theory: The Revival of the 
Misappropriation Doctrine 
The legality of appropriating valuable assets of competitors 
unworthy of patent or copyright protection is one of the most 
challenging questions of unfair competition law.  Prohibiting imitation 
on the grounds of the misappropriation doctrine is something that case 
law avoids and legal literature condemns.  It is difficult to see any tort in 
such cases because the alleged tortfeasor is competing on the price by 
imitation of unpatented material and his conduct is, therefore, covered 
by the competitive privilege. 
The misappropriation cause of action was articulated by the 
Supreme Court in the case of INS v. Associated Press (AP).65  The 
parties to the dispute were providers of news wire services.  INS was 
obtaining copies of AP’s newspapers, rewriting the stories, and 
distributing them to its network.  Due to the respective time span, INS 
was able to deliver the news before AP in some distant areas of the U.S. 
territory.  The Court found for AP and in a metaphorical manner, 
described the competitive behavior as an attempt of INS to “reap where 
it has not sown.”66  The essence of the wrong does not lie, as often 
thought, in the appropriation of the “harvest of those who have sown.”67  
The protection of the intangible asset was rather decided with the help 
of a “but for” approach by examining the competitive circumstances in 
the absence of protection.68  In such a scenario, INS would obtain a 
crucial and undeserved competitive advantage since the costs of 
collecting the marketed information would only be borne by AP.  INS 
would not even need to hire reporters.  Without legal intervention, the 
most probable outcome would be that the undertaking actually able to 
provide the demanded service would be driven out of the market.69  
Ascertaining the ratio decidendi of the case precisely leads to the 
conclusion that the result in INS was fact-specific.  Subsequent case law 
refused to recognize a general rule of misappropriation, as that would, 
 
65.  Int‘l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
66.  Id. at 239–40. 
67.  Id. 
68.  See To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law 
and Policy, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 11 (2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (for this method of awarding competition-
related exclusive rights). 
69.  Int‘l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 240–41. 
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in the view of the Court, undermine the competitive privilege.70  The 
commercial loss of the competitor and the harm to the public interest 
was clearly discernable in INS and it was thus easy to see the point in 
constructing the tort. 
As previously indicated, this is not valid for the evaluation of 
product imitation under the system of competitive torts because the 
harm to the injured party is one that the competitive order has good 
reasons to allow.  Excluding competitors by imitating their products and 
under pricing them is seen as a normal phenomenon in the competitive 
world.  Moreover, the configurations usually imitated are not deemed 
worthy of property-like protection.  The evaluation changes if one 
considers the interests of the consuming public deriving from a dynamic 
competition with differentiated products.  Instead of excluding rivals by 
undercutting the market price, competitors are challenged to win their 
customers by offering a product that comes closer to satisfying their 
preferences.  The promotion of this public interest justifies the 
construction of a competitive tort.71  The qualification of a conduct as 
tortious is not only an issue of whether a specific person has unlawfully 
damaged the interests of another.  The regulation of human behavior by 
tort laws aims at the promotion of social norms serving the public 
interest in general.  As a result, the prohibition of product imitation on 
the basis of the misappropriation doctrine is justified in view of the 
mandate for an effective competition.  It is therefore valid that 
misappropriating foreign goodwill in the form of market power 
attributed to product differentiation by design amounts to a competitive 
tort.  The observation of Justice Black in Standard Brands v. Smidler is 
indeed to the point: “the doctrine of so-called unfair competition is 
really a doctrine of unfair intrusion on a monopoly.”72 
 
70.  ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE 
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 263 (2003). 
71.  More specifically to the issue of competitive tort construction, see S. 
CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, CASES, COMMENTS, AND 
MATERIALS: TRADE REGULATION 42 (2d ed. 1950).  
72.  Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADEMARK DOCTRINE 
A.  The Inherent Distinctiveness of Trade Dress 
1.  The Requirement of Inherent Distinctiveness as a Balance of 
Interests 
The concept of distinctiveness is a method of setting limits to the 
trademark monopoly.  To avoid unnecessary burdens on competition, it 
is only unequivocal indicators of commercial origin that are deserving of 
trademark protection.  The legal evaluation is based on the actual 
(secondary meaning) or the alleged (inherent distinctiveness) consumer 
perception.  The comprehension of the substantive content of the legal 
term of distinctiveness presupposes its projection on the legal rationale 
of trademark protection.  If trademark law is seen as a set of norms 
protecting consumers from confusion regarding the commercial source 
of goods offered in the marketplace and undertakings from fraudulent 
trade diversion, then the signs qualifying as inherently distinctive are 
those that their usurpation by competitors would create exactly such 
type of commercial harm.73  On the other hand, if trademark law is seen 
in its initial conception as a part of the wider field of unfair competition 
laws that equally protects the interests of the right-holder, his 
competitors, and the consuming public, then it would be logical to 
assume that protection should be allowed even in cases of extremely 
weak distinctiveness so long as the granting of an exclusive right 
promotes an interest of the right-holder that the competitive order 
considers worthy of furtherance.74 
This thought has already found acceptance in trademark case law.  
Suggestive trademarks are not effective source identifiers from the 
perspective of the consumer since they contain, to a large extent, 
descriptive elements.  Regarding products offering protection against 
the sun’s rays, the word-mark “Coppertone,” for example, is neither 
generic nor descriptive because it does not directly connote to the 
consumer the kind of trademarked product.  The consumer has to 
engage himself in a process of guessing the type of product for which the 
 
73.  Mark P. McKenna, Teaching Trademark Theory Through the Lens of 
Distinctiveness, 52 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 843, 852–53 (2007–2008) (conceptually analyzing 
distinctiveness from the perspective of both consumer search costs and tortious harm to the 
right-holder). 
74.  Cf. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND STATE 
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 237–38 (revised 4th ed. 1999). 
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trademark is going to be used.75  Suggestive trademarks are protected 
because they are effective marketing instruments from the point of view 
of the trademark holder as they support his advertising campaign.76  The 
word-mark “Coppertone” has an advertising value since it connotes to 
the consumer not only commercial origin but also the positive aesthetic 
effect of the product on human skin.  This is an illustrative example that 
the decision to be made on a sign’s protectability as a trademark within 
the framework of the interpretation of the distinctiveness requirement is 
not exclusively driven by the information-transmission model of 
trademark protection.  On the contrary, since trademark law is a part of 
the set of norms regulating the competitive relationship, the right-
holder’s competitive interests should adequately be taken into 
consideration. 
2.  Case Law on the Protectability of Trade Dress 
Having depicted the theoretical background of the distinctiveness 
concept, it is now time to concretize it on the example of trade dress 
protection.  It is true that the consumer is not accustomed to perceiving 
product shapes as indicators of commercial origin.  It is also true though 
that product configurations have the potential of functioning as 
trademarks if the right-holder educates the public to treat them as such 
with the proper advertising measures.  The protection of trade dress 
claimants’ interests in obtaining protection against imitative competition 
furthers consumer interest in an effective competition with 
differentiated products.  Such interpretation brings trademarks in their 
actual context with their genus proximum, namely, the group of norms 
addressing the competitive process.  In the following paragraphs it will 
be shown that the legal notion finds support in case law after going 
through the various legal tests developed by courts in order to assess the 
inherent distinctiveness of trade dress. 
 
75.  THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 11:67 (Supp. 2008). 
76.  MCCARTHY, supra note 75, at § 11:63 (considering the protection of suggestive 
trademarks as a common law reaction to the actual use of such marks in competition).  
United Lace & Braid Mfg. v. Barthels Mfg., 221 F. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1915) (“Every good 
trademark is suggestive; once seen or heard, its association with the product is readily fixed in 
the mind. If there were no association of ideas between the two, it would require an 
independent effort of memory to recall the connection”).  Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. 
Alexander B. Stewart Orgs., 50 F.2d 976, 979  (C.C.P.A. 1931); Continental Scale Corp. v. 
Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc., 517 F.2d 1378, 1380 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“[A]s we have often 
pointed out and as is very well understood, suggestive words may be and frequently are very 
good trademarks”). 
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a.  The Approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in Chevron 
In Chevron v. Voluntary Purchasing the defendant marketed garden 
products using a bottle, which had a similar shape to that of its direct 
competitor.77  The court opined that trade dress could be inherently 
distinctive, just as every other type of mark.  No valid reason was found 
to treat the various trademark formats in a non-uniform manner, 
especially given that the Lanham Act itself does not make any 
distinction of that kind.  The trade dress at issue was held to be 
inherently distinctive in the meaning of the Abercrombie scale of 
distinctiveness because there was nothing in it connoting the nature or 
the characteristics of the trademarked goods.78  It was thus highly likely 
that the consumer would perceive it as a source indicator.  In its 
reasoning, however, the court based the outcome of the dispute on the 
assumption that trademark laws recognize a legitimate interest of the 
claimant to seek the protection of “the combination of particular hues 
of these colors, arranged in certain geometric designs, presented in 
conjunction with a particular style of printing, in such fashion that, 
taken together, they create a distinctive visual impression.”79  The 
protectability of trade dress is meant, in other words, not only to 
guarantee consumer protection against confusion but also as a matter of 
protecting traders’ product differentiation.  Both elements were 
relevant in affirming inherent distinctiveness. 
b.  The Seabrook-Test 
Seabrook Foods v. Bar-Well Foods was also a product packaging 
case involving the imitation of a “stylized leaf design,” which was an 
 
77.  Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 697 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (“The [claimant’s] package shows a background composed of three horizontal 
bands of color; the top 20% is white, the next 30% is yellow, and the bottom 50% is red.  
[Claimants] registered trademark, “ORTHO,” is printed on the white band in bold black 
letters, along with the distinctive chevron mark of the Chevron companies.  The yellow band 
contains the name of the particular product, e. g., Bone Meal, which is also printed in black 
letters.  The red band contains the required warnings regarding toxicity, general information 
about the product and its ingredients, and a drawing suggestive of the uses of the product, 
e.g., the insects which a particular pesticide will eradicate.  The printing in this red band is 
partly in black and partly in white.  The back of the package is white and yellow; the top band 
is white and is the same width as the top white band on the front, and the rest of the back is 
yellow.  The product's contents and directions for its use are printed on the back.  Those 
Ortho products sold in liquid form come in bottles bearing a label identical to the design just 
described.  The bottle itself is dark brown and has a yellow cap”). 
78.  Id. at 702–03. 
79.  Id. at 703. 
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element of claimant’s composite mark.80  The court did not challenge the 
proposition that trade dress has an equal ability of being inherently 
distinctive just as any other trademark form.  However, no recourse 
should be made on the methodology of Abercrombie because it was 
developed to fit word-marks only.81  The C.C.P.A. developed its own 
test to ascertain consumer perception of trade dress. 
In determining whether a design is arbitrary or distinctive this 
court has looked to whether it was a ‘common’ basic shape or 
design, whether it was unique or unusual in a particular field, 
whether it was a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and 
well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods 
viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the 
goods . . . .82 
In practice, the ruling disfavors product differentiation through trade 
dress protection because it does not protect industrial design 
incrementally improving on existing configurations, which is a typical 
action of location in the product space.  It is a test that fails to grasp the 
essence of trademarks as part of unfair competition laws because it only 
takes into account the consumer perspective of source identification 
since it seeks only to single out unique, unusual, or unexpected shapes 
for which one can assume that they will automatically be perceived by 
customers as an indicator of origin.83  The test has been rightfully 
praised for putting the trademark inquiry into its marketplace context 
by mandating a comparison of the mark at issue with the source 
identification methods of the relevant market.84  Nevertheless, it does 
not consider important and already-prescribed competitive interests of 
traders and consumers that should be part of the trademark law 
valuations.  Moreover, the rejection of Abercrombie as an authority is 
misconceived because this case, as the example of suggestive marks 
mentioned above shows, dictates a balance of all competitive interests 
involved when deciding on trademark protectability. 
 
80.  Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
81.  Id. at 1344. 
82.  Id. 
83.  MCCARTHY, supra note 75, at § 8:13; Adam J. Cermak, Inherent Distinctiveness in 
Product Configuration Trade Dress, 3 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 79, 89 (1994). 
84.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of 
Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471 (1997). 
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c.  The Supreme Court Ruling in Two Pesos 
Some judicial opinions concerned about competitive restrictions 
arising out of imitation bans had, in the meantime, required proof of 
secondary meaning for product design trade dress.  In Two Pesos v. 
Taco Cabana, the Supreme Court had to resolve a respective circuit 
split.85  The location in product space sought to be secured by means of a 
trade dress claim concerned in this case the interior design of a Mexican 
restaurant.86  Requiring secondary meaning for a successful trade dress 
claim would, according to the Court’s opinion, unduly shrink the scope 
of application of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and render trade 
dress protection a rare exception.87  The argument makes the point that 
such a legal notion would create social losses by lowering market 
transparency as it practically deprives the consumer from an additional 
tool of market orientation, namely the three-dimensional trademark.  In 
addition, the Supreme Court recognized that trademark law should 
protect non-reputational interests of the trade dress claimant; the 
protection against imitators was held to be necessary to provide the 
claimant the opportunity to expand his trade, which is after all a 
purpose promoted by the system of federal registration.88  That would 
not be possible if the imitation of his product was allowed in 
geographically-distant markets where he has not yet been active.89 
Read under the light of the circuit split that had to be resolved, the 
judgment should be interpreted as confirming the approach of the Fifth 
Circuit by accepting that trade dress can be inherently distinctive for the 
purposes of establishing trademark protection, not only as a matter of 
consumer perception but also for the sake of protecting other 
competition-related legitimate interests of the trader asserting a claim 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
 
85.  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
86.  Id. at 765 (protection was sought for “a festive eating atmosphere having interior 
dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals.  The patio 
includes interior and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from 
the outside patio by overhead garage doors.  The stepped exterior of the building is a festive 
and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas 
continue that theme”). 
87.  Id. at 774. 
88.  Id. at 775. 
89.  Id. 
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d.  The Qualification of Two Pesos: A Secondary Meaning Requirement 
for Product Design Trade Dress 
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.90 the Supreme 
Court was once again requested to rule on the requirements for 
trademark protection of trade dress. Samara’s claim pursuant to section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act concerned the imitation of its children’s 
clothing product line.  The trade dress claim extended to some one-
piece seersucker outfits featuring appliqués of hearts, flowers, and fruits.  
Wal-Mart, a big retail store, placed a large order of knock-offs to 
another clothing company, which it subsequently marketed at prices 
lower than those offered by the original manufacturer.  The opinion of 
the Court was delivered by Justice Scalia. 
Distinctiveness was again analyzed under the prism of two 
conceptually separate groups of interest: (1) the consumer interest in 
combating source confusion in the marketplace and (2) the more 
general concern for maintaining an effective competitive process.  The 
opinion concretized both evaluation principles in a manner that 
excluded protection.  As far as market transparency is concerned, the 
Court ruled that shape marks would not add anything, since consumers 
are not accustomed to identifying commercial source by relying on 
product design.91  Awarding a trademark right on a product design 
would thus amount to a creation of a monopoly without any redeeming 
precompetitive benefit with regard to source identification in the 
marketplace.92  Furthermore, protecting trade dress as an inherently 
distinctive mark would induce undertakings into a strategic game that 
the legal order has no interest in allowing.  Incumbent firms would raise 
trade dress claims to prevent imitative entry.  Potential entrants would 
consequently hesitate to penetrate the market.93  The result of the game 
 
90.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
91.  Id. at 212–13. 
92.  The imposition of a secondary meaning requirement has also been justified with 
the argument that otherwise trade dress protection would impermissibly encroach upon the 
field of application of patents and copyrights.  William F. Gaske, Trade Dress Protection: 
Inherent Distinctiveness as an Alternative to Secondary Meaning, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 
1128–31 (1988–1989).  The ruling of the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart can be linked to the 
substantive valuation expressed in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) 
that the trademark holder should not enjoy other than reputational competitive advantages 
as a result of his exclusive legal position.  Laura Thomson, Inherently Distinctive Trade Dress, 
12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 71, 76 (2001–2002). 
93.  Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 214–15; see also Jennifer L. Barwinski, Trade Dress: 
Should Only the Secondary Meaning Trade Dress Standard Apply to Product Packaging? Or 
Should Courts Continue to Use the Inherently Distinctive Standard?, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 119, 141–42 (2004) (arguing that for the same reasons proof of secondary meaning 
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would be a suboptimal level of competitive rivalry.  The outcome of 
such a balance of interests changes, according to the Court, when it 
comes to product packaging.  Since there are infinite ways to package a 
product, this type of trade dress poses no substantial threat to restrict 
competition and it is therefore not necessary to impose a secondary 
meaning requirement for product packaging trade dress.94  The Court 
also recognized a third category of trade dress referred to as “tertium 
quid,” which one could not categorically qualify either as product design 
or as product packaging.  In this case, the trade dress in dispute has to 
be analyzed so that a conclusion can be reached whether protection is 
sought on the configuration or the packaging of the product.95  Such an 
example would be the trade dress under consideration in Two Pesos. 
e.  Critical Analysis of the Wal-Mart Ruling: Inherent Distinctiveness of 
Trade Dress and Dynamic Competition with Differentiated Products 
The analytical approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart 
for deciding on the distinctiveness question is the proper one because it 
makes the inquiry dependent not only on consumer perception but also 
on other competitive parameters related to the effectiveness of 
competition.  The objections to the Wal-Mart ruling should be directed 
at the substantive valuation of the competitive interests involved.  Even 
if the consumer is not accustomed to making conclusions about the 
assumption of product liability based on trade dress design, the legal 
order may grant an exclusive right in the event that a product shape will 
develop a source-identifying function.96  The trademark monopoly 
would thus not constitute an unnecessary restriction of competition 
even if the redeeming precompetitive virtue is not present at the time of 
registration or claim assertion.  This interpretation of the distinctiveness 
requirement makes a wider protection of trade dress possible, which in 
turn stimulates a dynamic competition with differentiated products.  It 
might also be an example of a trademark system like the one described 
by Graeme Dinwoodie, which is actively shaping social norms instead of 
being reactive to consumer perception.97  The promotion of consumer 
 
should be required in the case of product packaging too). 
94.  Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 214–15. 
95.  Id. at 215. 
96.  This argument in favor of the protection of the non-conventional has been 
formulated by the former presiding judge of the German Supreme Court Eike Ullmann. Kur, 
supra note 26, at 208–09.  
97.  Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademark Law and Social Norms (2007), OXFORD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH CENTER, 
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welfare by allowing product differentiation has been expressly 
considered by the Fifth Circuit as part of the valuations relevant to the 
interpretation of trademark law dictated by federal statute.98  The 
protection of product differentiation promotes the policy against 
consumer confusion as well, since market transparency is more likely to 
exist when supply is heterogeneous.99 
The implication for trademark doctrine is that it is better to be 
permissive at the stage of ascertaining the inherent distinctiveness of 
trade dress and to seek to redress potential competitive harms when 
they arise in the marketplace rather than trying to exclude the 
possibility of competitive harm by requiring proof of secondary 
meaning.100  After all, competition is a discovery process 
(“Entdeckungsverfahren”)101 in the course of which we find out which 
products are demanded by consumers.  It is only after the interaction of 
supply and demand that we have enough input to spot restrictions of 
locational competition caused by imitation bans.  The approach of the 
Supreme Court in Wal-Mart is an attempt to resolve the legal problem 
of balancing the competitive interests in cases of product imitation in a 
rather procrustean manner by reducing the trade dresses protectable 
under the Lanham Act to a minimum.102  In this way it loses sight of 
 
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/documents/EJWP0207.pdf. 
98.  Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Ronald C. Cox and Sales U.S.A., Inc., 732 F.2d 417, 
429–30 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Travis L. Bachman, Inherent Distinctiveness, Product 
Configuration, and “Product Groups”: The Developing Law of Trade Dress, 23 J. CORP. L. 
501, 505–06 (1998); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (The 
purposes of the Lanham Act are to “secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his 
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.”); 
Michele A. Shpetner, Determining a Proper Test for Inherent Distinctiveness in Trade Dress, 8 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 947, 1001 (1997–1998) (pointing out that the 
interpretation of inherent distinctiveness is crucial for protection against copycats); Daniel J. 
Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75 MINN. L. REV. 769, 
785–87 (1991) (also linking trade dress protection to product differentiation).  
99.  Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 978–79 (2d Cir. 1987). 
100.  Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769–70. This approach was proposed by the Supreme 
Court in Two Pesos where the Court argued that the functionality doctrine guarantees that 
trade dress protection would not have anticompetitive effects.  
101.  FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 67 (1979). 
102.  For the same reason the test promulgated by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit in Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994) 
has to be turned down. Accordingly, a configuration must be (i) unusual and memorable; (ii) 
conceptually separable from the product; and (iii) likely to serve primarily as a designator of 
origin of the product. Id. at 1434. The test cannot provide a conceptual framework for 
balancing the competitive interests involved since its second element practically considers 
product features as non-eligible for trademark protection.  See Dinwoodie, supra note 84, at 
539–41.  Additionally, the third criterion is in addition intended to eliminate the possibility of 
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product differentiation as a constitutive element of the system of 
effective competition.  The opinion of the Court emphasizes the 
potential negative effects of an abusive intellectual property litigation 
aimed at excluding competitors and preventing market entry without 
examining the economic aspects of product imitation.103  Furthermore, 
the distinction between product design and packaging is of ambivalent 
normative value.  Nowadays, packaging is an additional form of product 
differentiation meant to generate demand for the trademarked good.  
Let us take the trade dress disputed in Two Pesos, for example.  During 
the oral hearings it was debated whether the interior design of a 
restaurant qualifies as product design or packaging.104  The latter view 
prevailed at the thought that the actual good sold was the food and not 
the restaurant décor.  This approach does not reflect contemporary 
marketplace reality and modern economic theory.  We live in an 
experience economy where the consumption of commodities includes 
the enjoyment of product attributes that accompany the main product.105  
Eating in a restaurant is, from the demand perspective, not simply the 
consumption of food and beverages but an experience influenced by the 
atmosphere of the surroundings.  The décor is part of the bundle of 
characteristics (consumable good) created by the supplier.  Sound 
trademark policy has to take such economic factors into account. 
In order to achieve the proper balance between the commercial 
source identification as a justification ground for trademark protection 
and the competitive necessity for protecting product differentiation, the 
inherent distinctiveness of trade dress has to be, as a matter of principle, 
accepted if there are enough alternative configurations for competitors 
 
acquisition of non-reputational competitive advantages based on trade dress protection even 
if the configuration at issue fulfills an origin function.  Id. at 541–43.  Equally unsatisfactory is 
the approach to inherent distinctiveness taken by the Second Circuit in Knitwaves Inc. v. 
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).  The claimant has to prove that the primary 
purpose behind the design was to identify its product’s source.  Id. at 1008–09.  Although the 
Knitwaves test seems to allow for protection of product differentiation, it places the 
importance on the intention of the claimant and is thus not considering the possibility that the 
alternative configurations are limited. 
 103.  See Michael J. Meuer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive 
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B. C. L. REV. 509, 531–35 (2002–2003) (analyzing Wal-
Mart from the perspective of abusive litigation). 
104.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763 (1992) (No. 91–971).  
105.  See generally B. JOSEPH PINE II & JAMES H. GILMORE, THE EXPERIENCE 
ECONOMY: WORK IS THEATRE & EVERY BUSINESS A STAGE: GOODS & SERVICES ARE NO 
LONGER ENOUGH (Harvard Bus. Press 1999). 
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to participate in the market.106  In other words, trademark protection of 
product differentiation by product design should be the rule unless the 
restricted number of differentiation possibilities speaks to the contrary.  
Such an administration of the distinctiveness requirement is necessary 
to build the normative correlation of trademarks to the superordinate 
set of norms governing the competitive process.  Trademarks are a part 
of unfair competition law. 
The Second Circuit has been particularly generous in awarding trade 
dress protection without demanding an unequivocal finding that the 
consumer will perceive the configuration at issue as an indicator of 
commercial origin.107  It has namely ruled that in a market where there is 
an almost limitless supply of patterns, colors, and designs, the unique 
combination of commonly used elements (differentiation) would 
amount to trade dress protectable under the Lanham Act.  The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a 
sweater consisting of standard Aran stitches combined to create a 
unique Aran-style design was inherently distinctive.108  The court’s 
opinion does not seem to focus on the putative consumer perception of 
the trade dress at issue.  It explicitly justifies the legal protection by 
referring to the right-holder’s position of interest in protecting his effort 
to convey a commercial message by differentiating within a fashion 
standard, which is held protectable in light of the fact that the possible 
combinations of Aran-style stitches are innumerable, and as a result, 
there would be no danger of market foreclosure.109  Both cases apply 
Abercrombie in that they recognize a rule that considers trade dress as 
arbitrary when the design choices in the relevant market are almost 
infinite because under such circumstances, product shape is not driven 
 
106.  Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 
887, 954–55 (arguing that if the number of alternative designs is limited in a certain market 
segment, then trade dress would be aesthetically generic. Although he reaches the same result 
the concept of aesthetic genericness does not analyze the actual collision of interests involved 
in a trade dress dispute). 
107.  See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Imp. & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583 (2d 
Cir. 1993).  
108.  Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1115–17 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  The 
Aran-design category refers to a traditional Irish style of knitting that additionally served to 
identify fishermen’s background and relationship to their environment.  Id. at 1105. 
109.  Id. at 1115–16 (“Express puts forward evidence to show that Aran sweaters are a 
fashion standard, but that same evidence also reveals that there are numerous stitches in 
Aran knitting, and that these stitches can be combined in innumerable ways within the 
confines of a traditional Aran pattern.  Indeed these stitches seem akin to the fishermen’s 
alphabet, woven together in different combinations to convey the desired message of its 
creator”). 
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by functional considerations.110  However, it is to be noted that the 
acceptance of a protectable interest of the right holder in marketing a 
product, which is different than others on the market (differentiation), 
significantly contributes to the positive decision on trade dress 
protectability. 
Similarly, in Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures Inc.111 the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of New York affirmed the 
inherent distinctiveness of claimant’s playground equipment although it 
was a combination of elements commonly used in the industry.  Overall, 
the total impression created by the trade dress at issue was found to be 
unique.  The argument that the claimant has a distinct product line and 
markets a different product than his competitors underlies the opinion 
and supports the finding of inherent distinctiveness.112  The decision on 
protectability is thus influenced by the right-holder’s interests at stake 
without much elaboration on the public interest against confusion.  In 
another case, the Southern District of New York held the respective 
trade dress protectable as inherently distinctive mainly because its 
trademark monopolization would not have an adverse effect on the 
ability of rival firms to compete.113  In Callaway Golf Co. v. Golf Clean 
Inc. the court broke the Searbrook-Test into three conceptually separate 
limbs so that it was sufficient for fulfilling the distinctiveness 
requirement that the design of the golf club marketed by claimant was 
unique in the sense of looking “noticeably different than any other club 
on the market.”114  In assessing the inherent distinctiveness of the trade 
dress at issue by establishing its uniqueness compared to the competing 
products the court was depicting, in the subconscious manner described 
by Posner, the claimant’s location in the product space.  His design was 
compared to other products “pleasingly different” as he adopted a 
“chunky and aggressive wide top line” for his product.115 
The case law discussed in this section tends to reach a finding of 
inherent distinctiveness of a trade dress if the respective shape or design 
differs from that of the competing products.  If protecting product 
differentiation is a right-holder’s interest that should be part of 
 
110.  Id. at 1115; see also Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Imp. & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 
583 (2d Cir. 1993). 
111.  Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
112.  Id. at 1173–74. 
113.  Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., 1996 WL 125641, 7–9 (S.D.N.Y.). 
114.  Callaway Golf Co. v. Golf Clean, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1206, 1212–13 (M.D. Fla. 
1995). 
115.  Id. at 1212. 
CHRONOPOULOS- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2011  11:04 AM 
150  MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 16:1 
 
trademark protection, independent of the policy against source 
confusion as a result of its integration into the system of competitive 
norms, then the dogmatic underpinnings of the distinctiveness 
requirement should be altered to protect such a competitive interest.  In 
terms of trademark theory, the cases seem to adopt the concept of 
differential distinctiveness, which stands for the capacity of the 
trademark to stand out from other signs, regardless of its ability to 
connote the commercial source of the marked goods.116  The concept has 
been developed to protect the advertising value of a sign and is a 
doctrinal tool to protect trader interests embodied in a trademark other 
than those of signifying commercial origin.  The issue of the 
protectability of a trademark’s advertising value goes beyond the scope 
of this paper, although the economic analysis undertaken above points 
to an affirmative answer. 
Analyzing a trade dress case under the differential distinctiveness 
concept, namely the uniqueness of a trade dress, is the theoretical 
vehicle to protect through trademark laws legitimate competitive 
interests of the right-holder, the protection of which enhances dynamic 
competition.  It has been argued that the distinctiveness inquiry should 
not depend on the availability of alternatives because such valuation 
belongs to the normative field of application of the functionality 
doctrine.117  The problem with such an approach is, however, that if the 
balance of interests related to the protection of product differentiation 
is deferred for the stage of examining functionality, then this analysis of 
colliding competitive interests could not be effectuated within the 
system of trademark protection, since non-functionality cannot by itself 
establish protection when the requirement of distinctiveness is not met.  
In other words: In order to make a balance of all interests colliding in a 
trade dress case, the respective legal evaluation has to be part of the 
distinctiveness inquiry.  Distinctiveness is after all the central 
requirement of trademark protection and it has to provide substantive 
valuations regarding protectability. 
 
116.  Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
681–82 (2004). 
117.  Dinwoodie, supra note 84, at 597–602; see also Publications International Ltd. v. 
Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339–40 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing the different procedural 
aspects of the two doctrines: “Formally, distinctiveness and functionality are separate issues. 
While the burden of proving distinctiveness is of course on the plaintiff, some courts, 
including our own, hold that functionality is an affirmative defense and so the burden of 
proof rests on the defendant.”). 
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B.  The Scope of Protection: Confusion or Association? 
Protecting trader interests related to trademark use other than 
source identification leads to an expansion of the protective scope of 
trademark rights.  Since the protectable interest is an individual one, 
trademark law tilts towards a proprietary type of protection.  The 
protection of product differentiation through trade dress rights would 
be unattainable if the scope of protection was defined on the basis of 
likelihood of confusion.  The imitation ban has to go beyond that to 
guarantee for the right-holder the protection of his choice of location in 
the product space.  The relevant trademark concept is that of 
“subliminal confusion,” which is basically an application of the 
misappropriation doctrine in the trademark context.  It refers to 
associations that lead to misappropriation of the advertising value of a 
trademark without creating source confusion.118  More specifically, 
competitors may not misappropriate the favorable associations of the 
consumers with regard to the senior mark.  Equally, competitors should 
imitate the trade dress of third parties in a manner that gives them the 
opportunity to market the same bundle of characteristics. 
C.  Limits to Trade Dress Protection: New Ground for the Functionality 
Doctrine 
1.  The Constitutional Right to Copy 
a.  The Relevant Case Law 
The Constitutional Right to Copy is a theory standing for the 
proposition that there cannot be any trademark rights on product 
configurations because the patent and the copyright system mandates 
absolute freedom of imitation outside their field of application.  
Moreover, the exclusion of product shapes from trademark protection is 
a constitutional mandate flowing out of the Intellectual Property Clause 
(IPC), which practically means that both the federal and the state 
legislatures cannot act to the contrary.119 
The doctrinal development goes back to the early Supreme Court 
rulings on the legality of product simulation such as Singer Mfg. Co. v. 
 
118.  Steven H. Hartman, Subliminal Confusion: The Misappropriation of Advertising 
Value, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 506, 508–09 (1988). 
119.  See generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, LAW AND POLICY 192–93  (3d ed. 2010); see also ANNE GILSON LALONDE, 
supra note 1, at § 2A.10[3]. 
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June Mfg. Co.120 and Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.121  In terms of 
the facts, both cases have in common that the products imitated, a 
sewing machine and pillow shaped cereal respectively, incorporated 
technical and aesthetical norms revealed in expired utility and design 
patents.  The Supreme Court derived a freedom to copy such articles 
based on the bargain theory of patent law.122  The exclusive right is 
supposedly given in consideration for the dedication of the patented 
subject matter to the public by putting the respective product 
configuration at the disposal of imitators after the expiration of the 
patent.  The public interest against source confusion and fraudulent 
trade diversion, according to the Court, ought to be served by 
sanctioning the omission of the competitor to mark his imitative product 
with his own sign of origin via state unfair competition law.  In any 
event, the act of imitation could not as such rise to a violation of 
trademark rights on a product configuration, even if product simulation 
was creating confusion.  The invocation of the patent bargain for 
supporting this legal result shows that the Court understood the 
freedom to copy as a principle arising from the patent laws. 
The exact meaning of those rulings remained unclear for many 
years.  The question left open was whether the prescribed right of the 
public to copy was only valid for the case of imitative actions following 
the expiry of patent rights, or whether it was also referring to items that 
have never been patented either because there was no filing of a 
respective invention or because the teaching embodied in the relevant 
product configuration was not patentable or copyrightable in the first 
place.123  In both cases, no bargain between the inventor/author and the 
state with regard to a specific item took place.  The issue was 
reexamined by the Supreme Court in its two landmark decisions of 
1964, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Company124 and Compco Corp. v. 
Day Brite Lighting, Inc.125  In the meantime, the legal problem of the 
relationship between the patent laws and trade dress protection took on 
 
120.  Singer Mfg. v. June Mfg., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
121.  Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).  Kellogg has proved to 
be one of the most important authorities in U.S. trademark law addressing various doctrines.  
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with 
Brandeis,  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES (R. Dreyfuss & J. Ginsberg, eds., Foundation 
Press 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=744026. 
122.  Singer Mfg., 163 U.S. at 185-87; Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 119–23. 
123.  Paul Bender, Product Simulation: A Right or Wrong? 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1228, 
1236 (1964). 
124.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
125.  Compco Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
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an additional dimension due to the following reason.  After the federal 
courts were stripped of their authority to create federal common law,126 
disputes of diversity jurisdiction involving the unfair competition cause 
of action had to be decided by the application of state laws.  This 
brought patent and trade dress law in a normative hierarchical 
relationship whereby patent laws as federal legislation were to be held 
as a higher norm pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
The opinion of the Court in Sears analyzes the field of conflict 
between patent laws and state unfair competition statutes that renders 
the latter unconstitutional.  The defendant’s imitation of the pole lamp 
marketed by the plaintiff was qualified under Illinois law as palming off.  
Production restrictions belong, according to the Court, to the realm of 
the patent laws.  Forbidding imitation on the grounds of state unfair 
competition law is therefore, in the Court’s view, an encroachment upon 
federal jurisdiction on intellectual property matters.  The imitation ban 
was allegedly annulling federal patent policy because it was extending 
the monopoly on the product configuration after the expiry of the 
exclusive right and for an unlimited time.127  During litigation, the 
plaintiff’s patents on the pole lamp had been held invalid due to the lack 
of an invention.  Although there was no formal act of dedication of the 
product design to the public because there had been no valid patent 
bargain between an inventor and the state with regard to the specific 
configuration, the Court found the imitation prohibition to be contrary 
to federal patent policy because the state legislature was creating a 
property right on something that the Patent Act attributes to the 
public.128  The evolutional step taken in Sears is that the substantive 
ruling of the Court spots a conflict between patent law and the 
prohibition of product simulation based on passing-off principles.129  The 
Supremacy Clause dictated the preemption of the state statute against 
palming-off by the federal patent laws. 
The second case, Compco, involved a similar set of facts.  The 
petitioner had been held guilty of unfair competition under Illinois law 
 
126.  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
127.  Sears, 376 U.S. at 231. 
128.  Id. at 231–32. 
129.  Id. at 232. (“[If the claim is successful then t]he result would be that while federal 
law grants only 14 or 17 years´ protection to genuine inventions, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173, 
States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent 
at all under federal unconstitutional standards. This would be too great an encroachment on 
the federal patent system to be tolerated.”) 
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for having verbatim imitated a light reflector, which was designed to be 
used on fluorescent lighting fixtures.  The arguments set forth in Sears 
were repeated.  The Supreme Court took a step further and opined that 
the unconstitutionality of the state statute does not result from its 
conflict with federal patent policy by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 
but due to its collision with the valuations of the Intellectual Property 
Clause, which provides for timely limited property rights on novel 
intangible subject matter.130  The practical importance of this assertion is 
great.  It means that the protection of trade dress by a federal statute 
such as the Lanham Act is unconstitutional. 
b.  The Quest for a Dogmatic Foundation of the Constitutional Right to 
Copy 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not elaborate further and 
gave no insight in the dogmatic underpinnings of the constitutional right 
to copy.  Its opinion provoked commentators to question or confirm its 
legal reasonableness.  The ruling in Compco, created a furor in the 
trademark world because it actually sought to eliminate the 
functionality doctrine.131  Courts would not be compelled to engage 
themselves in the puzzling inquiry of whether a product feature is 
functional or not.  It would suffice to simply ascertain the usefulness or 
the ornamental character of a shape so as to dismiss the trade dress 
claim altogether.  Moreover, Compco was read as eradicating the 
misappropriation doctrine in the field of product imitation.132 
Corroborative to the argumentation put forward by the Supreme 
Court in Compco is the work of Malla Pollack, who has written 
extensively on the topic.  She falls back on the historical interpretation 
of the IPC and argues that the phrase “for limited times” encrypts an 
intention of the constitutional fathers to use intellectual property rights 
as a means of bringing new items into the public domain.133,134  
 
130.  Compco, 376 U.S. at 237–38. 
131.  Derenberg, Product Simuilation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 
1204-08 (1964). 
132.  James M. Teece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 
U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 90 (1964–1965); Derenberg, supra note 131, at 1192 (“The roof had 
seemingly fallen in on a vast structure of federal and state precedents laboriously built up 
since the days of the Court’s famous decision in the International News case”). 
133.  Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional Right not to be 
Excluded–Or the Supreme Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v. National 
Biscuit Co., 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 265, 286–87 (2000). 
134.  For an account of IP rights as a mechanism of creating public goods, see EDMUND 
W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 
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Accordingly, trade dress protection is unconstitutional because it 
interferes with the right of the public to make use of the public 
domain.135  In addition, the IPC makes provision for Authors’ Exclusive 
Rights (AERs) and Inventors’ Exclusive Rights (IERs), which have to 
be limited in duration.  The mortality of the legal position vindicates its 
exclusive nature.  Since trade dress protection is unlimited in duration, 
the argument goes, its constitutionality becomes a matter of whether it 
is qualitatively equivalent to an AER or an IER.136  In the view of 
Pollack, trade dress rights are equivalent to those rights prescribed by 
the IPC since they lead to production bans, namely exclusive rights on 
product configurations.137  This is because likelihood of confusion can be 
established by the imitative act itself.  The argument of equivalency 
becomes more persuasive when it comes to protection from product 
imitation based on a dilution claim.138 
Equivalency was also conceived in terms of market power.139  It is 
only the limited rights conferred by the IPC that are meant to provide 
the right holder with the ability to raise prices and reduce output.  The 
meaning of the constitutional provision is that the ability to exercise 
market power based on a legal monopoly should be a timely restricted 
reward for inventions and copyrightable works.  The protection of 
product configuration under trade dress protection rules is therefore 
unconstitutional because it confers market power for an unlimited 
 
48–54 (2d ed. 1979) (commenting on the Sears/Compco doctrine). 
135.  The legal construction implementing the constitutional right to copy is complex.  
Since trademarks find their constitutional foundations in the Commerce Clause (CC), it is 
argued that the IPC sets limits to legislation enacted under the CC by negative implication.  
The difficult question is how could the IPC forbid state legislation on trademark protection of 
trade dress because the question of whether the state legislator has retained authority to pass 
laws on intellectual property manners is still unclear.  See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE 
NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 448-68 (2002).  The solutions proposed by Pollack are a) that the federal IP 
laws, which are enacted in execution of the IPC, would preempt state trade protection by 
virtue of the Supremacy Clause b) the doctrinal development of a dormant IPC and c) 
indirect intervention of the IPC with the relevant state legislation by a limitation of the 
dormant CC.  See Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the 
Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of 
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259 (1995).  These issues are not to 
be analyzed here any further. 
136.  Pollack, supra note 135, 289.  An application of her theory renders the 
incontestability of a functional trademark unconstitutional. 
137.  Pollack, supra note 133, 297–99. 
138.  See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998). 
139.  Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 
1160–62 (2000). 
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period of time without enriching the public domain with an original or 
inventive public good.  The contemporary economic analysis of Compco 
suggested that the Supreme Court sought to eliminate the possibility of 
sustaining positions of economic power deriving from product 
differentiation through trade dress law.140  Market power due to product 
differentiation supported by a sign protectable under the Lanham Act 
could only derive from reputational values created by the seller 
embodied in a more traditional trademark such as a word or a picture 
mark.141  This point had been already suggested by the Supreme Court in 
Kellogg, where it had been held that sharing on the product goodwill of 
an article not eligible for patent protection does not amount to unfair 
competition.142 
The recognition of a constitutional right to copy has also been put 
forward that according to the IPC, there could be no exclusive right on 
an intangible thing in the absence of an original or a non-obvious 
performance.143  The argument draws upon case law, which considers 
that the copyright concept of originality and patent requirement of 
novelty are constitutionally mandated.144  Thus, the federal legislator 
could not award property rights on non-patentable and non-
 
140.  James M. Treece, Protectability of Product Differentiation: Is and Ought 
Compared, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1027 (1963–1964). 
141.  James M. Treece, Copying Methods of Product Differentiation: Fair or Unfair 
Competition? 38 NOTRE DAME L. 244, 250 (1962–1963). 
142.  Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938). 
143.  Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational 
Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595, 637–46 (1996).  The arguments of 
Pollack and Davis are complementary in supporting the existence of a constitutional right to 
copy.  David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An 
Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care, 59 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213 (1996); Karl Horlander, The U.S. Constitutional Limits of 
Product Configuration Trade Dress Rights, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 752 (2007), is of the opinion 
that trade dress protection for subject matter once disclosed in a patent is unconstitutional.  
Trademark protection for trade dress has also been disapproved with a an argument arising 
from the literal interpretation of section 45 of the Lanham Act, which includes in the 
protectable subject matter words, names, symbols, or devices, or any combination thereof.  
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does not 
Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1138-48 (2000), argues that the 
terminology of section 45 of the Lanham Act refers to the distinction between technical 
trademarks and tradenames of the previous law and therefore it is evident that the federal 
legislator did not intent to protect trade dress in the absence of fraud.   
144.  Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
(holding unconstitutional the protection of a telephone catalogue by applying the “sweat of 
brow” doctrine by arguing that the constitutionally mandated requirement of originality is a 
limitation of congressional power to legislate in the field of IP); see also, Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (ruling that the IPC forbids the federal legislator to provide for 
protection of obvious inventions). 
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copyrightable subject matter.  In essence, the freedom of imitation is 
deducted e contrario from the high thresholds for IP protection. 
c.  Evaluation of the Constitutional Right to Copy as a Legal Doctrine 
The logic behind the positive recognition of constitutionally 
mandated individual rights in the public domain is to create a 
counterbalance to the growth of intellectual property both in terms of 
expanding existing rights and creating new exclusive legal positions.145  
The interest prevailing in cases of product imitation is that of the public, 
which is concretized as the enjoyment of a competitive process free 
from monopolistic positions arising out of property rights to the greatest 
extent possible.  The model has the disadvantage that it is rather static.  
It fails to balance the interest of trademark holders in receiving 
protection against imitative competition and the possible benefits of the 
consumer that would be derived by coercing competitors through 
imitation bans to dynamically compete by substitution. 
In order to ascertain the constitutional mandate, Pollack falls back 
on historical contextualism, seeking to show that by adopting the phrase 
“limited times,” it was the creation and maintenance of a Lockian 
common that the constitutional fathers had in mind.146  The problem 
with such an interpretation is that it exaggerates in downsizing the scope 
of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the ability of the 
Congress to shape a dynamic competitive process by regulating 
imitative activity.  Furthermore, her interpretation stands for the 
prominence of the Intellectual Property Clause over the Commerce 
Clause, whereas constitutional theory instructs that in case of colliding 
norms of the Constitution, the law interpreter should strive to guarantee 
a balanced limitation of conflicting interests and policies so as to achieve 
the unity of the ultimate set of norms.  Moreover, the idea of an 
evolving constitution does not support this argumentation.  Even if at 
the time of the Constitution’s inception the competitive ideal was 
absolute freedom of imitation outside the application scope of AERs 
and IERs, the economic analysis conducted already shows that this is 
not the case today.147  The wording of the Constitution and especially the 
coexistence of the Intellectual Property and the Commerce Clause can 
 
145.  David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 
passim (1981). 
146.  For this method of ascertaining the normative content of constitutional norms see 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. Rev. 849, 853 (1989). 
147.  See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. REV. 204 (1980) (opposing historical contextualism). 
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support a more modern interpretation where IP rights regulate 
innovation and unfair competition laws imitative activity in general so as 
to achieve the effectiveness of competition. 
That is also why the argument of e contrario derivation of the 
freedom of imitation principle from the high standards of IP protection 
fails.  Setting high thresholds of protection is part of the legislative 
objective of encouraging the generation of innovations and works of 
authorship.  They are not meant to regulate the optimal degree of 
imitation in a system of effective competition.148 
The argument that regards trade dress protection as unconstitutional 
because, allegedly, only patent and copyright laws are meant by the 
constitutionally mandated competitive order to confer market power 
through product differentiation is also flawed.  The economic analysis 
conducted above shows that the concept of effective competition allows 
for the protection of such positions of economic power, even if the 
intangible subject matter supporting it is not patentable or 
copyrightable.149  However, it can become particularly fruitful, since it 
points to the right line of thinking.  It reveals that the key to approach 
the issue of overlapping intellectual property rights on product design is 
to consider that each exclusive position is meant to confer a different 
degree of market power for a different competitive purpose. 
2.  The Federal Preemption Doctrine: Establishing a Peaceful 
Coexistence Between Patent, Copyright, and Trade Dress Protection 
Subsequent case law departed from the sweeping language of the 
Supreme Court in Compco.  The first blow on the constitutional 
preemption doctrine was struck in Goldstein v. California, where the 
Supreme Court held that a state statute criminalizing the piracy of 
 
148.  See Interpart Corp. v. Imos Italia, Vitaloni, S.p.A., 777 F.2d 678, 685 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“[T]he patent laws ‘say nothing about the right to copy or the right to use, they speak 
only in terms of the right to exclude.‘  The California law does not “clash” with the federal 
patent law; the two laws have different objectives.  Absent an existing patent right, we see 
nothing in the federal patent statutes that conflicts with California's desire to prevent a 
particular type of competition, which it considers unfair.  This California statute is not 
preempted by federal law, contrary to the district court's conclusion.”). 
149.  Just as any other IP right, trademarks do also offer the right-holder the possibility 
to exercise market power.  See Josef Drexl, The Relationship Between the Legal Exclusivity 
and Economic Market Power: Links and Limits, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MARKET 
POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 191, 195 (Inge Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds. 2008) 
(using the example of exercising control over price by forbidding parallel importations of 
goods already marketed outside the EU).  See also Oppenheim, The Public Interest in Legal 
Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property, 40 TRADEMARK REP. 613, 624 (1950) 
(emphasizing the link between trademarks, product differentiation and market power). 
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sound recordings was not in conflict with the Constitution.150  The Court 
opined that the IPC was exclusively addressing the breadth of 
Congressional jurisdiction in legislating to create AERs and IERs.  It 
did not purport to exclude the state legislator in every possible respect 
from regulating intellectual property matters.151  As long as 
Congressional power remained unaffected exactly as prescribed in the 
IPC, the state legislature had its own room to maneuver in 
implementing state copyright policy.  In particular, as far as sound 
recordings were concerned, the Court opined that the fact that Congress 
left that type of work unprotected did not indicate an intention to 
preempt the field of regulation, so as to forbid the construction of a 
state monopoly on the same subject matter.  The absence of federal laws 
was attributed to the special circumstances of the specific industry, 
which was, in those days, considered to be of rather local importance.  
This made legislation at federal level unnecessary.152  As a result, no 
unconstitutionality issue of the kind articulated in Sears or Compco 
arose because there was no conflict between the state statute and 
federal copyright policy.153 
State regulatory power over discoveries in terms of providing 
protection for trade secrets was also affirmed as going in tandem with 
federal patent policy.154  If an object claimed as a trade secret is non-
patentable or of doubtful patentability, then there is no conflict with the 
patent policy of providing incentives for disclosing discoveries to the 
public because the patent system itself does not promote the public 
disclosure of such subject matter.155  Furthermore, there is no public 
interest served by disclosing items such as customer lists or advertising 
campaigns.  Moreover, it would undermine dynamic competition by 
reducing incentives to compete based on one’s own innovative business 
methods.156  Even when it comes to the protection of patentable subject 
matter under trade secret law and both regimes share a common field of 
application, no inconsistencies arise in the legal order by the existence 
of two parallel systems of promoting innovation.157  The exclusionary 
 
150.  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
151.  Id. at 560–61. 
152.  Id. at 557–58. 
153.  Id. at 561 (the issue of unconstitutionality was accordingly examined under the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
154.  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
155.  Id. at 483, 487–88. 
156.  Id. at 483. 
157.  Id. at 484, 489. 
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effect of trade secrecy is substantially weaker than that of a patent since 
an independent discovery of the claimed item does not violate the trade 
secret rights asserted upon it.158  The inventor is thus prone to elect to 
disclose his discovery for the consideration of a patent, since it does not 
pay risking the loss of the competitive advantage of the exclusive use of 
patentable subject matter.  The preference of trade secrecy over the 
acquisition of a patent would, according to the Court, be such a rare 
exception that it creates no danger of impeding the progress of science 
and the useful arts by withholding technical information.159 
It remains uncertain if the coexistence of patents and trade secrets is 
as frictionless as presented by the Supreme Court in Kewanee.160  In any 
event, as already indicated, the two sets of norms serve distinct 
purposes, the legal implementation of which is of such importance for a 
competitive economy, that none of them could supplant the other.  The 
protection of trade secrets by the national legislator does not therefore 
collide with the patent policy crafted by the Congress.  The issue of 
preemption of state legislation was again examined pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause and not the IPC. 
In the landmark case of Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court repeated 
in clear terms that the IPC has no direct impact on the legitimacy of 
state-crafted monopolies.161  The legal question there concerned the 
constitutionality of a Florida statute providing for patent-like protection 
of unpatented boat hull designs by prohibiting the use of a direct 
molding process for their duplication.  State legislation was found to run 
afoul of patent policy for two reasons: (a) the prohibition of imitation is 
a hindrance to sequential innovation by refinement,162 and (b) imitation 
was seen as the “lifeblood” of a competitive economy,163 which is only 
true if the emphasis is put on static efficiency though.  Even if the state 
statute was held to contradict the ratio of the patent policy prescribed 
by the IPC, its unconstitutionality was based on the Supremacy Clause. 
Falling back on Paul Goldstein’s analysis of the discussed case law is 
instructive for understanding the outcome in Bonito Boats.  He makes 
the point that all the property rights conferred by state law in the 
 
158.  Id. at 490. 
159.  Id. at 490–91. 
160.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 2.5a–2-59 (Supp. 2009). 
161.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
162.  Id. at 146. 
163.  Id. 
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aforementioned cases have a valuable role to play in a competitive 
economy.164  The effectiveness of competition would suffer if the IPC 
could on its own, independent of other constitutional provisions, 
dismantle precompetitive exclusive rights such as trade secrets or 
trademarks.  The federal preemption doctrine is the legal construction 
that guarantees the implementation of an effective competition in this 
sense.  It vests upon Congress a mandate to legislate so as to maintain a 
competitive economy.  The constitutional mandate is derived not only 
from the IPC but also from other provisions of the economic 
constitution such as the Commerce Clause.  At this point, the 
Supremacy Clause intervenes and makes the concept of effective 
competition the yardstick for ascertaining the constitutionality of state-
legislated property rights.  That could not be possible if the normative 
content of a single constitutional provision, like the IPC, could override 
the marketplace concerns served by other constitutional provisions. 
The public interest against source confusion is a constitutive element 
of a system of effective competition, which is distinct from the 
valuations of the patent system and on its own worthy of legal 
protection.165  The same goes for the regulation of imitative activity so as 
to promote the welfare resulting from a dynamic competition with 
differentiated products.166  In the trade dress context this means that the 
 
164.  Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, CAL. L. REV. 873, 878–
80 (1971). 
165.  Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality 
Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 344–49 (2004) (arguing that the hurdles of distinctiveness and 
non-functionality for obtaining trademark protection are adequate doctrinal tools to avoid 
conflicts with patent and copyright system); Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress Protection for 
Product Configurations: Is there a Conflict with Patent Policy? 24 AIPLA Q.J. 427 (1997) 
(arguing in addition that the necessity of proving a likelihood of confusion and the flexibility 
of trade symbol remedies requiring measures to eliminate confusion created by imitation 
exclude the possibility of such conflicts); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Is this Conflict Really 
Necessary?: Resolving an Ostensible Conflict Between Patent Law and Federal Trademark 
Law, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 25, 62–63 (1999) (pointing out that it is in any event 
difficult to imagine that trade dress would lead to a monopoly in the antitrust sense).  See also 
Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638–39 (7th Cir. 1993). 
166.  If unfair competition regulates as a competitive tort imitative activity of 
competitors irrespective of the existence of expired IP rights on the same subject matter, this 
means that the theories negating trade dress protection with the argument that the various IP 
rights should be partitioned regarding their field of application are not valid.  As it will be 
shown trade dress protects product design for different purposes than patents and copyrights.  
Tobias U. Braegger, An Economic Analysis of Overlapping Protection for Product 
Configuration Trade Dresses – Applied to the Legal Systems of the United States of America, 
the European Union, Germany, and Switzerland, 40–50, available at 
http://www1.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/SysLkpByIdentifier/2974/$FILE/dis2974.pdf (arguing, for 
example, that there is an institutional economic inefficiency to protect trade dress with 
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competitive mandate imposed on Congress creates an obligation of the 
latter to conciliate patent laws with the protection of trade dress. 
3.  An Introduction to the Functionality Doctrine 
The concept of functionality in trademark law is far from clear 
because there is no consistent and generally accepted idea regarding its 
rationale, be it in court opinions or in the legal literature.  Given this 
fact, the only legal definition that can avoid the possibility of a mistake 
would be to broadly define functionality as a legal doctrine reacting to 
the competitive concerns that arose after trade dress was held 
protectable subject matter under the unfair competition cause of action 
and subsequently under the Lanham Act.167  Functionality may bar 
protection of product configurations either as a non-fulfilled affirmative 
element of a trade dress claim or as a successful defense against an 
infringement action.168  Apart from that, de jure functional trade dress 
cannot be federally registered (Section 2(e)(5) Lanham Act).  With 
regard to the substantive content of the doctrine, the Inwood case 
contains a legal rule which was incorporated later on in the ratio 
decidendi of Supreme Court opinions.  Accordingly, “a product feature 
is functional . . . if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article, or if 
it affects the cost or quality of the article.” 169  The judicial definition of 
the functionality doctrine does not reveal much for its normative 
content because its formulation may support different interpretations. 
4.  Defining de jure Functionality in Terms of Competitive Need 
One way to interpret the Inwood formulation is to consider that it 
describes situations where the exclusive right on a product configuration 
influences the ability of a competitor to somehow compete with the 
right-holder.170 
 
various types of exclusive rights.). 
167.  DINWOODIE, supra note 97, at 157; see also Note, Unfair Competition and the 
Doctrine of Functionality, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 544, 551–52. 
168.  RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 19:7 (Supp. 2011); See ANNE GILSON LALONDE, supra 
note 1, at § 2A.04. 
169.  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850, n.10 (1982). 
170.  LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that 
“[t]his conclusion is reinforced when evaluated against the rationale of the functionality 
defense: encouraging competition by preventing advances in functional design from being 
monopolized.  K mart's ability to compete is not unduly hindered by the determination that 
LeSportsac's particular configuration of design features is nonfunctional and therefore 
eligible for protection.”)  The competitive need rationale is also adopted by the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition:  
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The essentiality of the product feature refers to a situation where a 
design is necessary to participate in a market in the sense of being able 
to manufacture a specific type of product.  Accordingly, the exclusive 
position of an undertaking on a product feature should not put 
competitors at a competitive disadvantage by raising production costs or 
by restricting his ability to compete on quality because there are only a 
few alternative forms that confer these advantages.  The competitive 
need rationale is, therefore, to be understood as a question of ability to 
compete effectively by substitution.171  In the absence of such a 
competitive need, the right to copy should be restricted by imitation 
bans to avoid consumer confusion that would arise if imitative activity 
were free.  By allowing protection of product configurations not needed 
to compete in the market, the functionality doctrine promotes economic 
efficiency in that it minimizes confusion flowing out of product 
imitation.  According to this view, functionality is not simply a method 
to avoid conflicts with patent policy but also a doctrine that serves 
search cost minimization.172  Imitation of design leads inevitably to some 
degree of confusion because it triggers associations between different 
products. 
The competitive necessity of a trade dress is, therefore, determined 
in the light of its superiority in terms of function, economy of 
manufacture, or some other economic variable.  The C.C.P.A. has 
provided guidance regarding the evidence required for affirming de jure 
functionality of trade dress.  Four factors are relevant:173 (a) the 
existence of an expired utility patent that discloses the utilitarian 
advantages of the shape sought to be registered as a trademark; (b) the 
claimant’s advertising material touting the utilitarian superiority of his 
trade dress; (c) the availability of alternative designs; and (d) evidence 
that the specific design promotes productive efficiency. 
 
A design is ‘functional’ for purposes of the rule stated in  section 16 if the design 
affords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services 
with which the design is used, apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s 
significance as an indication of source, that are important to effective competition by 
others and that are not practically available through use of alternative designs. 
171.  Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Ronald C. Cox., 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984).  
(providing that “[the design is legally functional if it] is only one of of a limited number of 
equally efficient options and free competition would be unduly hindered by according that 
design trademark protection.”). 
172.  Thurmon, supra note 165, at 350–59. 
173.  In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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5.  The Distinction Between Utilitarian and Aesthetic Functionality 
According to this legal notion, a distinction should be drawn 
between utilitarian and aesthetic product features.  While there are 
infinite ways of designing an aesthetically pleasing trade dress, the 
features that serve the utility of the product cannot be arbitrarily chosen 
with the same convenience.  The potential for competitive harm arising 
from trade dress protection is, for that reason, much more tenacious 
when it comes to utilitarian features.  Consequently, it is necessary to 
create different rules concretizing the de jure functionality of each type 
of trade dress.  This is the current state of the law as established by the 
Supreme Court in TrafFix.174  The respective trade dress claim 
concerned a dual-spring design built upon road signs so as to keep them 
upright during windy weather.  The design has been revealed in expired 
utility patents.  According to the Court, the technical character of the 
trade dress under consideration was a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the finding of de jure functionality.  Thus, if the first prong of the 
definition is satisfied and the trade dress claimed is found to serve a 
technical purpose, then de jure functionality could be established 
without being necessary to examine the existence of alternative 
designs.175  Applied to the specific facts, the dual spring was held to be de 
jure functional because it was simply the reason why the device worked.  
The justification provided by the Supreme Court for this ruling was also 
supported by competition-related arguments.  The Court seems to 
recognize a protectable interest of competitors not to be restricted in 
their freedom to copy design features driven by technical 
considerations.  Accordingly, there is no duty imposed upon 
competitors to use an alternative configuration.176 
On the other hand, the Court found no protectable interest of the 
trade dress claimant at stake, since the Lanham Act, in contrast to the 
patent laws, does not purport to reward innovative effort.177  
Furthermore, the Court refused to protect investments on utilitarian 
product design that aimed to monopolize it through the creation of 
secondary meaning.  The outcome was equally affected by the thought 
that trade dress protection of utilitarian configurations would inhibit the 
innovative process.178  Finally, the Supreme Court ruled on the relevance 
 
174.  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
175.  Id. at 33. 
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. at 34–35. 
178.  Id. 
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of expired patents for the determination of functionality and opined that 
in such cases there is a presumption of functionality.179  The ruling seems 
to use the burden of proof to resolve a competition-related matter, a 
method often deployed by antitrust in cases where a blanket balance of 
pre- and anticompetitive effects of a certain competitive behavior is not 
feasible. 
The argument that competitors should not be coerced to compete by 
substitution is in its generality flawed as the economic analysis of 
product differentiation shows.  Trade dress protection as part of a 
system of competitive norms promoting effective competition should, 
on the basis of imitation bans, stimulate dynamic competition.  In 
addition, the Supreme Court did not accurately prescribe the 
protectable interest of the trade dress claimant, which is the protection 
of his location in product space (differentiation) so that he can obtain 
the degree of market power necessary to successfully market his 
products.  The protection of this interest also serves the public interest 
in dynamic competition.  Freedom of imitation is the proper means to 
foster innovation when sequential innovation is important, or when a 
technical configuration is an artifact of technological information that 
should be at the disposal of all manufacturers without distinction.  If this 
is not the case, then trade dress protection of these shapes would 
stimulate innovative activity by directing manufacturers to try out and 
develop multiple technical solutions.  The limits to such protection 
should be sought in the concept of dominant design, namely to the 
observation that at some point of product development a technical 
design emerges that is durable and supports mass production.180 
The Supreme Court confirmed the vitality of the competitive need 
rationale for determining functionality in the field of aesthetically 
effective product design.181  At first glance the doctrine seems to be a 
legal concept without a considerable field of application.  For example, 
only under exceptional circumstances would an ornamental design be 
considered an essential input for participating in a market.  The 
respective didactic example is a heart-shaped box for a product market 
including goods to be delivered on Valentine’s Day.  A rare example 
from case law is the finding of de jure functionality of a luminaire’s 
 
179.  Id. at 29–30. 
180.  An example would be the basic shape of automobiles.  Differentiation builds 
upon certain commonly shared product features. On the concept of dominant design, see 
generally James M. Utterback and William J. Abenarthy, A Dynamic Model of Product and 
Process Innovation, 3 OMEGA INT’L J. MGMT. SCI., 639 (1975). 
181.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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design because its shape was necessary to achieve architectural 
compatibility with a specific type of building.182  A number of theories of 
aesthetic functionality have been put forward to confine the right-holder 
to reputational advantages and to prevent him from obtaining economic 
benefits as a consequence of the trademark protection of an 
aesthetically pleasing design (identification theories of aesthetic 
functionality).183  The application of those theories reduces the scope of 
trade dress protection for aesthetically pleasing product design.  This 
line of argumentation is flawed because it does not consider that 
product differentiation is, in terms of competition policy, desirable and 
one of trademark law’s substantive valuations.  Competitive need 
should be the threshold for denying protection on the grounds of 
aesthetic functionality (competition theory of aesthetic functionality).184  
 
182.  Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981). 
183.  See Mitchell M. Wong, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law of 
Trade-Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1132–65 (1997–1998) (providing an 
analytical overview of those theories with case law examples).  Under the “indicia of source 
test” a feature is protectable as trade dress if it exclusively serves the designation of the 
commercial source of the product.  The “actual benefit” test asks whether the design adds to 
the product any additional value other than information about its source.  The “consumer 
motivation test” denies protection if the considered trade dress is a factor that affects the 
consumer decision to buy the product.  The “commercial success test” excludes from 
protection a design that contributes to the commercial success of the product for reasons 
other than source identification.  See also Publications International Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 
F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[o]n the other hand, a seller should not be allowed 
to obtain in the name of trade dress a monopoly over the elements of a product's appearance 
that either are not associated with a particular producer or that have value to consumers that 
is independent of identification.  In the lingo of unfair competition, elements of the latter 
type—elements whose value is not merely signification—are a product's ‘functional’ features; 
They [sic] can be either utilitarian in the narrow sense of that word, or aesthetic . . . . But if 
consumers derive a value from the fact that a product looks a certain way that is distinct from 
the value of knowing at a glance who made it, then it is a non-appropriable feature of the 
product”). 
184.  Some opinions in the literature point out that the competitive rationale of 
functionality promotes design differentiation and simultaneously advances classic trademark 
goals as it eliminates source confusion arising out of imitative activity.  See Robert Unikel, 
Better By Design: The Availability of Trade Dress Protection for Product Design and the 
Demise of “Aesthetic Functionality”, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 312, 332–42 (1995); Erin M. 
Harriman, Aesthetic Functionality: The Disarray Among Modern Courts, 86 TRADEMARK 
REP. 276, 299–303 (concluding that this test provides a balance between the freedom and the 
fairness of competition).  The result is that functionality prevents only effective, not imitative 
competition.  The effectiveness of competition is therefore considered according to this 
opinion not a good in itself but a way to promote classic trademark policy since competition 
on product design by substitution would minimize confusion.  Another way to restrict the 
exclusive effect of aesthetic functionality regarding trade dress protectability is to adopt a 
utilitarian approach and exclude protection only when an aesthetic feature is of substantial 
value in the use or efficiency of a product, Deborah J. Krieger, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic 
Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51 FORHAM. 
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If a certain product feature is not necessary for competing with the right 
holder, then competitors should be prompted to compete by 
substitution.  Shrinking the scope of the functionality doctrine in such a 
way promotes dynamic competition by protecting product 
differentiation by design. 
Concluding on the evaluation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
TrafFix, it should be noted that the Court restricts the protection of 
trade dress in the field of useful articles drastically and undermines the 
protection of product differentiation.185 
6.  The Ruling of the Tenth Circuit in Vornado Air Circulation Systems, 
Inc. v. Duracraft Corporation 
The court’s analysis of the functionality doctrine puts grave 
emphasis on the potential of trade dress claims to suppress the ability of 
the public to practice inventions disclosed in expired utility patents.186  
Accordingly, the test promulgated by the Tenth Circuit asks whether a 
feature being part of a claim in an expired utility patent amounts to “a 
significant inventive aspect of the invention so that without it the 
invention could not fairly be said to be the same invention.”187  In other 
words, the feature would be considered as de jure functional, if it is 
deployed for implementing the special advantages brought forward by 
the technical rule disclosed in the patent and is described as such in the 
claims or the patent specification. Therefore, it becomes immaterial, for 
the purposes of trade dress protection, whether the trade dress at issue 
is simply one of a wide group of alternative configurations that could 
bring forward the same technical result. 
The claimant had obtained a patent for a fan with multiple features 
including a spiral grill.  The latter feature has been included in the 
patent claims as the element of the fan that enabled an optimal air-flow.  
The inventive significance of the grill was also emphasized in the 
 
L. REV. 345, 378–82 (1982–1983). 
185.  Commentators that consider product differentiation an anticompetitive 
phenomenon argue that TrafFix is in the right direction in the sense that it restricts trade 
dress protection.  Timothy M. Barber, High Court Takes Right Turn in TrafFix, but Stops 
Short of the Finishing Line: An Economic Critique of Trade Dress Protection for Product 
Configuration, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 259, 279–86 (2003).  See also Margreth 
Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix 
on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 136–57 (2004) (arguing in favor of the 
Sears/Compco doctrine). 
186.  See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996). 
187.  Id. at 1510. 
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claimant’s advertising campaign.  A competitor copied the feature at 
issue without infringing the patent, which had not expired yet.  Then, 
the claimant asserted trade dress rights thereupon. 
The court ruled for the defendant arguing that the feature was 
functional in the aforementioned sense.  The spiral grill at issue was 
specifically designed so as to allow an optimal air flow. This teaching of 
the patent should be available for the public to practice.  It is immaterial 
according to the Vornado-rule that other designs might work equally 
well in optimizing the air flow.  As a matter of federal patent policy the 
public should, according to the Tenth Circuit, be able to practice the 
invention exactly as it is disclosed in the patent application.  The court 
seems actually to put the emphasis of its analysis on the “disclosure 
theory” of patent law.  Furthermore, the court considered that an item 
of inventive significance contained in an expired utility patent should 
remain in the public domain so as to promote innovation through 
diffusion of existing technical knowledge.188  If trade dress protection 
were granted, the claimant would be able to prohibit third parties to 
practice the invention exactly as taught in the specification even after 
the expiry of the patent.  The threat of consumer confusion arising from 
product imitation becomes, therefore, a peripheral concern of the 
Lanham Act. 
The ruling of the court can be criticized in many respects.189  For 
sure, it fails to balance the competitive concerns involved.  Where there 
are many equally effective alternatives capable of reducing the same 
technical rule to practice, trade dress protection would minimize 
confusion attributed to imitative activity without seriously inhibiting the 
ability of the public to make use of the underlying inventive idea.  
Allowing trade dress protection in this case would amount to a more 
effective reconciliation between patent and trademark law policy.190 
An additional critique is that the judgment encourages third parties 
to successfully attack product configurations effectively operating a 
trademark function simply because they have been previously disclosed 
in a utility patent.  If there is a large number of alternative 
 
188.  The relevant patents had not expired yet at the time the trade dress issue was 
being argued.  The court felt probably the need to bar trade dress protection in the fear that 
the trademark would have achieved the status of incontestability by the time the patents 
would have expired.  Functionality was not then a valid ground to challenge the validity of an 
incontestable trademark.  See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, Inc., 9 F.3d 1091 
(4th Cir. 1993). 
189.  See DINWOODIE, supra note 97, at 189–94. 
190.  Thurmon, supra note 165, at 350-55; DINWOODIE, supra note 97, at 192–93.  
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configurations able to implement the same technical rule the inventor 
would probably choose to adopt the configuration that he would also 
like to have as a trademark after the expiration of the patent.  The 
choice of the configuration would, in such case, reflect not only 
technical considerations but trademarking or even marketing concerns 
as well.  A competitor would then be in a position to destroy that 
trademark by arguing he has the right to copy the configuration 
included in the patent specification that forms a significant inventive 
aspect of patented technical rule, although, he does not need it so as to 
compete effectively with the party alleging infringement of trade 
dress.191 
7.  Functionality and Trademark Genericity 
Functionality is to a certain extent linked to the notion of 
genericness.  An extreme theoretical example of a shape being de jure 
functional due to the competitive necessity of its free use by third 
parties would be a trade dress claim over the shape of an airplane or a 
football.  Because the plaintiff in such cases seeks to monopolize 
“features somehow intrinsic to the entire product,”192 the doctrine of 
functionality could be paralleled to the genericness concept.  It is true 
that under these extreme sets of facts, functionality and genericity 
overlap.  However, functionality purports to redress more subtle 
competitive harms regarding locational competition as we shall see.  
Trademark genericism refers in the context of trade dress simply to the 
competitive harm caused by the monopolization of the archetypical 
configuration of the product.193 
8.  The Competition Theory of Functionality and Its Economic Analysis 
In our view, functionality has to be decided on the ground of 
competitor’s ability to compete effectively with the trade dress right-
holder.  This permissive approach is dictated by the need to promote a 
dynamic competition with differentiated products and is a result of the 
substantive integration of trademarks into the set of norms regulating 
competition.  The limits of the trade dress protection are to be 
ascertained by analyzing its effects on the marketplace,194 and not by an 
 
191.  Thurmon, supra note 165, at 334–38 (analyzing ASICS Corp. v. Target Corp., 282 
F. Supp. 2d. 1020 (D. Minn. 2003)). 
192.  W.T. Rogers Co. v. Wendell R. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985). 
193.  See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982) 
(separating the two doctrines). 
194.  This is a consequence of the complementarity principle.  See also Anna F. 
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abstract reference to the ideal of a competitive process, which is free 
from exclusive rights to the greatest extent possible.195  As already 
indicated, the substantive valuation underlying the competitive need of 
the functionality doctrine is the postulate of maintaining locational 
competition by preventing the foreclosure of submarkets through trade 
dress claims. 
a.  Defining Submarkets 
The submarket concept is an analytical tool for identifying and 
remedying locational anticompetitive effects.196  The notion is that 
within a relevant antitrust market there are narrower groupings of high-
substitutable products in respect of which competitive harm may be 
independently analyzed.  These market segments are particularly 
susceptible to the exercise of market power.  The analytical tool of 
submarket definition seeks to ascertain independent locations in 
product space either by grouping together products that are 
interchangeable on objective grounds offering an equivalent 
consumption bundle, or by spotting cluster effects on the market 
attributable to consumer preferences for specific product characteristics 
without recourse to the hypothetical monopolist test.  This definition is 
derived by projecting the criteria held by case law to be the yardstick for 
defining submarkets on the economic principles related to locational 
competition.  In the much-celebrated case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that the boundaries of a submarket may 
be determined by such practical indicia as “industry or public 
 
Kingsbury, Market Definition in Intellectual Property Law: Should Intellectual Property 
Courts Use an Antitrust Approach to Market Definition?, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 63, 66–73 (2004).  More specifically in the trademark context, see Diana Elzey Pinover, 
Aesthetic Functionality: The Need for a Foreclosure of Competition, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 
571, 600–04 (1993).  See generally Drexl, Intellectual Property Rights as Constituent Elements 
of a Competition-based Market Economy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MARKET 
POWER  167 (Gustavo Ghidini & Louis Mariano Genovesi eds., 2008). 
195.  For the latter approach, see Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Product Simulation: A Right or a 
Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV.  1216 (1964); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1661 (1999); Anthony E. Dowell, Trade Dress Protection of Product Designs: Stifling the 
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts for an Unlimited Time, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 137 
(1994–1995); Melissa R. Gleiberman, From Fast Cars to Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of 
Product Trade Dress under s. 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2037 (1992–1993); 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 367 (1999); Kevin E. Mohr, At 
the Interface of Patent and Trademark Law: Should a Product Configuration Disclosed in a 
Utility Patent ever Qualify for Trade Dress Protection?, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339 
(1997). 
196.  See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In 
Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 203 (2000–2001). 
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recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the 
product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, 
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and 
specialized vendors.”197 
In the antitrust domain, the submarket concept has found a field of 
application in cases where the effects of a merger between firms selling 
differentiated products have to be assessed.  The harmful effect of 
substantially lessening competition prescribed by section 7 of the 
Clayton Act as the legal ground for prohibiting a merger is to be seen in 
the disappearance of locational competition.  On the basis of such an 
argument the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) opposed Staples’ 
proposed acquisition of Office Depot.198  Both firms were office 
superstores active in the business of consumable office supplies.  The 
acquisition was prohibited as substantially lessening competition in the 
submarket of consumable office supplies sold by superstores because 
after their merger, the respective location would be served by only two 
undertakings.199  The importance the decision puts on locational 
competition is evident by the fact that a submarket was defined even 
though the products involved were identical to those of the wider 
product market of consumable office supplies.  The independent 
location of the product space resulted from product differentiation with 
regard to the sales outlet.  The Court delimited a submarket for office 
supplies sold by superstores. 
For the purposes of section 2 of the Sherman Act the submarket 
analysis is unsuitable.200  The monopolization offense aims at the 
protection of the integrity of the competitive process while taking an 
extremely cautious stance towards interfering with unilateral conduct in 
competition in the fear of discouraging undertakings to compete 
rigorously.  For the value system of section 2 of the Sherman Act the 
exercise of market power is in principle desirable in order to maintain 
incentives to compete but also for the sake of the benefits associated 
with big undertakings such as economies of scale or capacity to allocate 
resources for innovation.  Demand substitutability ascertained by the 
application of the Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in 
Price (SSNIP) test is therefore the proper analytical tool for achieving 
 
197.  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
198.  Federal Trade Comm‘n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). 
199.  Id. at 1081–86. 
200.  PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 533c, 254–57  (3d ed. 
2007). 
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the goals set by the legal order in section 2.  By shrinking the boundaries 
of the antitrust market in a specific line of commerce, the law would in 
fact penalize the unilateral acquisition and exercise of market power. 
b.  The Relevance of Submarkets for Trademark Law 
The systematic adherence of trademarks to the rules regulating the 
competitive process means that the application of trademark rules 
cannot ignore the actual effect of the exclusive right on the marketplace.  
Locational competition should therefore be a concern of trademark 
law.201  The argument that it is not worthwhile, from the perspective of 
the enforcement costs,202 to detect and prevent locational competitive 
harm cannot be persuasively made.  No antitrust-like economic analysis 
is needed since the Brown Shoe factors are objective.  Moreover, the 
application of the submarket concept is not a more difficult task than 
the administration of the group of factors relevant for the diagnosis of a 
likelihood of confusion, where no factor is determinative for the 
outcome of the dispute. 
If trade dress protection should be broadened in order to protect 
both the right-holder’s interest for protection against imitation and the 
interest of the public for product variety and dynamic competition, then 
the limits of such protection should guarantee that locational 
competition remains unaffected.  This observation is analytically 
instructive for the understanding of the phenomenon of the cumulation 
of different intellectual property rights on a single product 
configuration.  Copyrights and patents are allowed to lead to 
monopolizations covering single locations of the product space.  Such a 
degree of market power seems logical when considering that the right-
holder contributes an original or innovative intangible asset to the 
public domain.  Regarding product configurations not covered by 
patents or copyrights, the conference of such a degree of market power 
through trade dress rights would be disproportional.  Trade dress 
 
201.  That is why functionality should not be assessed by measuring demand elasticity 
as this concept cannot address locational competitive harm.  Contra Mark A. Cunningham, 
Utilitarian Design Features and Antitrust Parallels: An Economic Approach to Understanding 
the Functionality Defense in Trademark Litigation, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 569, 585 
(1996). 
202.  Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 
2099, 2174–81 (2004); Thomas F. Cotter, The Precompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property 
Law, 40–47 (Washington & Lee Legal Studies, Paper No. 2005–25, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=870307; Harold R. Weinberg, Is the 
Monopoly Theory of Trademarks Robust or a Bust?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 137, 172 (2005–
2006).  
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protection aims at maintaining a dynamic competitive process where 
product variety is accomplished by imitation bans coercing competitors 
to compete by substitution.  The degree of market power that accrues to 
the right-holder should only serve this purpose.  Accordingly, trademark 
law is not allowed to suppress locational competition within submarkets. 
c.  Trade Dress Cases Invoking the Submarket Concept 
Some court opinions that make de jure functionality dependent on 
competitive necessity, address issues of locational competition by 
deploying a submarket analysis.  In Vornado, the Tenth Circuit based its 
functionality ruling on an alternative ground.  By examining consumer 
preferences in the broader market for fans, it identified that there was 
enough consumer demand for the design sought to be protected by the 
claimant to create a submarket for fans with spiral grills.  The 
functionality doctrine was applied in order to maintain competition 
within the boundaries of this submarket.  The Eighth Circuit held the 
design of a pocket structure for trousers functional because the features 
claimed as trade dress had a competitive appeal that the consumer 
sought to find at the most attractive price and were therefore de jure 
functional.203  The court detected cluster effects arising from consumer 
preferences and opined that the demand created for this type of product 
should not be captured by means of a trademark monopoly.  Most 
importantly, it did not focus on the potential utilitarian value that the 
feature conferred on the product, but it rather sought to ascertain 
whether the creation of a separate demand is attributed to the consumer 
perception regarding appeal of the trade dress.204 
In Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 
Inc.,205 the claimant asserted trademark protection for the 
ornamentation of his line of silverware products.  The court opposed to 
the trademark monopolization because the features claimed as trade 
dress were indispensable for producing baroque silverware.  For that 
particular product there was enough demand to consider it a substantial 
market (submarket).206  Trademark protection would lead to the 
 
203.  J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941).  
204.  Id. (“If, however, the public believes generally that a certain feature adds a 
utilitarian value to the goods—whether it actually does or not—and will be materially 
influenced to purchase them on that basis, over other competitive goods in the market, it will 
be held to be functional.”) 
205.  Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991). 
206.  See Mark Bric Display Corp. v. Joseph Struhl, 2003 WL 21696318, 6 (D.R.I.) 
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foreclosure of the submarket for baroque silverware.207  The court was 
actually addressing locational competitive harm.  An example of a 
submarket delineated by the peculiar characteristics of the product can 
be found in the case of In re Babies Beat Inc.208  Although the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) did not explicitly refer to 
the submarket concept, it used the respective methodology.  At first it 
analyzed the de facto functional aspects of the product configuration 
under consideration.  The configuration of the plastic baby bottle 
claimed as trade dress served its tangibility and made it easier to clean.  
Since the same functional purposes could be served by numerous 
alternative designs, the TTAB opined that protection under the Lanham 
Act would not adversely affect competition.209  Harm to locational 
competition was therefore not possible.  In such cases, the assessment of 
functionality requires a determination of the contribution of the design 
to the bundle of product characteristics210 and the effects of its 
trademark monopolization on locational competition. 
In Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.,211 the 
question of functionality regarded a multi-purpose handheld tool.  
 
(concluding that if the trade dress supporting a claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
does not confer a significant market share to the claimant, then no submarket can arise and 
trademark protection is not threat to cause harm to locational competition). 
207.  Id. at 80–81 (providing that “[the district Judge] found in the instant matter that 
there is a substantial market for baroque silverware and that effective competition in that 
market requires [use of essentially the same features] as are found on Wallace's silverware . . . 
. [W]hatever secondary meaning Wallace's baroque silverware pattern may have acquired, 
Wallace may not exclude competitors from using those baroque design elements necessary to 
compete in the market for baroque silverware.  It is a first principle of trademark law that an 
owner may not use the mark as a means of excluding competitors from a substantial 
market.”)  See also Lon Tai Shing Co., Ltd. v. Koch & Lowy, 1991 WL 170734, 32 (S.D.N.Y.).   
The only remaining question is whether trade dress protection for the overall design 
of the Dove [bird-like design of a table lamp] could preclude LTS from competing 
for a substantial portion of the market.  There is little question that the design of the 
Dove is attractive to a significant number of purchasers of halogen table lamps, but 
this does not demonstrate preclusion of alternative lamp designs. . . . LTS would 
have to show, at the very least, that a significant number of customers or potential 
customers prefer halogen table lamps that have the type of minimalist bird-like 
profile featured by the Dove, and that there are no alternative designs that might 
appeal to these customers. . . . The record does not reflect either such a consumer 
demand or a lack of attractive alternative designs, and thus LTS has failed, on the 
present record, to carry its burden on the functionality defense. 
208.  In re Babies Beat Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1729 (T.T.A.B. 1990). 
209.  Id. at 1730–31. 
210.  Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law, Functional Design Features, and the 
Trouble with TrafFix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 37 (2001). 
211.  Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., 199 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Despite the existence of alternative designs the court denied protection 
because no other configuration offered the same functional advantages 
in the sense that all other available shapes led to heavier and bigger 
tools.212  The analysis of the Ninth Circuit is indeed reminiscent of the 
practical indicia set forth in Brown Shoe.  On top of everything, the 
ruling refers, even if this happens in an indirect manner, to the 
submarket concept, since it justifies the outcome by stating that the 
trade dress claimant “does not have the right to preclude competition in 
any particular subset of the overall market.”213 
In Banff v. Limited, Inc.214 a particular expression of the elements of 
an Aran sweater was held non-functional because it was not “essential” 
for competing in the market for Aran sweaters.  Competitors would be 
able to market their own Aran sweaters after creating their own unique 
combination of Aran style stitches.215  Trade dress law should not in any 
event lead to monopolization of a decorative style216 (submarket).  It 
should be noted though, that the suppression of locational competition 
(monopolization of a decorative style) is possible in the case of a design 
patent covering an innovative design.  The different degree of market 
power, which can be permissibly exercised by different IP rights, is a 
perspective that facilitates our understanding of the overlaps between 
design patents and trade dress. 
The economic analysis of the functionality doctrine based on the 
theory of product differentiation leads to the conclusion that the inquiry 
of the competitive necessity of the trade dress should refer to the 
availability of alternative designs that would allow competitors or new 
entrants to effectively compete by marketing a reasonably substitutable 
product.  The competitive necessity refers to the ablility of competitors 
to participate in a market delineated by antitrust methodology.  On the 
other hand, when the Courts inquire on the availability of comparable 
alternative configurations in the spirit of Brown Shoe, they practically 
engage themselves in an analysis of locational competition. 
Another instructive case is Disc Golf Ass’n v. Champion Discs, 
Inc.217  Disc golf is a game whose aim is to throw a frisbee at a target that 
catches it and drops it into a basket below.  Plaintiff obtained a patent 
 
212.  Id. at 1013–14. 
213.  Id. at 1014. 
214.  Banff  v. Ltd., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
215.  Id. at 1114–15. 
216.  Id. 
217.  Disc Golf Ass`n v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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covering a parabolic chain configuration for disc golf targets.  After the 
expiration of the patent, he attempted to extend his monopolistic 
position by asserting trade dress rights on the target’s configuration.  In 
the meantime the trade dress in dispute had become the standard target 
used by 77% of the disc golf courses in the United States.  The court was 
not concerned about a possible continuation of the patent monopoly on 
the specific configuration but it mainly disfavored the exercise of such a 
degree of market power based on a trade dress claim. 
The case is helpful in analyzing the phenomenon of cumulative 
protection of product design by various IP rights.  The market power 
secured by the patent aims at rewarding inventive activity by means of 
ensuring the possibility of the inventor to charge the price offered in the 
market for his invention.  The reward is proportional to the qualitative 
level of his contribution.  Monopoly power suppressing locational 
competition does not amount to a social loss in this case because the 
patentee has dedicated a novel, useful item to the public in 
consideration.  When the patent monopoly expires, the exercise of 
market power by means of asserting an IP right on a product 
configuration cannot be justified by reference to the argument that the 
patentee deserves a reward for his inventive contribution.  The 
dedication of the technical rule to the public allows competitors to use 
alternative configurations so as to compete with the right holder.  If 
there are many alternative configurations implementing the teachings of 
the expired patent, then trade dress protection would promote product 
differentiation in the marketplace.  The protection of a configuration 
disclosed in an expired utility patent should not be a priori considered as 
an impermissible extension of the market power conferred by the 
patent.  Trade dress protection is concerned with promoting 
differentiation by regulating imitative activity.  The existence of expired 
exclusive rights does not say anything about the optimal degree of 
imitative activity in a given market. 
Trade Dress protection is, in other words, meant to confer market 
power to the right-holder for different purposes than those of the patent 
system.  It confers market power to the right-holder primarily for the 
sake of fostering a dynamic competition with differentiated products.  
Where the assertion of trade dress claims enables the exercise of market 
power restricting locational competition, the degree of market power 
exercised by the trademark holder reaches a level that should only 
accrue to a patent or a copyright.  The relationship between legal 
exclusivity and market power is the key to discern the cases where trade 
dress protection becomes the practical equivalent of an expired utility 
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patent, a question left open by the Supreme Court in TrafFix.218 
V.  CONCLUSION: A PROPERTY THEORETIC APPROACH OF 
TRADEMARK LAW 
Trademark rights are used in competition to secure competitive 
advantages that go beyond source identification.  The actual aim is to 
exercise market power by capturing goodwill as an intangible asset that 
leads to consumer patronage.  Current trademark theory frowns upon 
such an expansion of the trademark monopoly because it rests on the 
false normative premise that the competitive mandate dictates a 
competitive order, which is kept free from exclusive legal positions to 
the greatest extent possible.  The economic analysis of product 
differentiation shows that competing by imitation often creates losses in 
dynamic efficiency.  The misappropriation doctrine as an unfair 
competition cause of action can coerce competitors to compete by 
substitution in such cases so as to promote the effectiveness of 
competition.  If trademark rights are used for a purpose that the 
competitive order approves and promotes, then the expansion of the 
scope of protection beyond the level necessary to prevent confusion is 
legitimate.  As part of unfair competition law, trademarks should 
implement such substantive valuation.   This indicates that trademarks 
might be protected independently from a confusion-based rationale.  
Such proprietary protection of trademarks presupposes the 
ascertainment of the interest sought to be protected by the right-holder, 
who uses his legal exclusivity for a purpose other than source 
identification.  This interest should be balanced with potentially 
colliding interests of competitors and the public.  If the individual 
interest prevails or its furtherance contributes to the effectiveness of 
competition, then the trademark claim asserted for a non-confusion 
related purpose, e.g. protection from imitative competition, should be 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
218.  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001). 
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